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Abstract
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a Radio Frequency (RF) technology that allows data to be
exchanged between devices that are in close proximity. An NFC-based mobile coupon (M-coupon) is a
coupon that is retrieved by the user from a source such as a newspaper or a smart poster and redeemed
afterwards. The NFC-based mobile coupon (M-coupon) is a cryptographically secured electronic message
with some value stored at user’s mobile. The M-coupon requires secure issuing and cashing (redeeming).
Uncontrolled copies of the M-coupons would cause losses for a company and damage its reputation. The
main goal of this thesis is to enhance the security of NFC mobile coupon protocols.
In order to address the NFC M-coupon threats, there are specific and general security requirements. For
the specific NFC M-coupon requirements, a number of protocols have been proposed in the literature. We
perform a formal security analysis of NFC M-coupon protocols, using formal methods (CasperFDR), in an
effort to check the the security of these protocols and whether they address their requirements. We develop
a general framework of capturing the NFC M-coupon requirements and apply it to four existing protocols
in the literature, and two new protocols that we have developed.
The general security requirement that affects all NFC protocols is the issue of relay attacks. A relay
attack happens when an intruder extends the distance between two NFC devices while both devices are
under the impression they are close to each other. We propose three NFC User Key Confirmation Protocols
(UKC) to address the NFC relay attack. The UKC protocols are a collaboration between the cryptographic
protocols, the user and the NFC mobile in an effort to prove the proximity. We formally verify the three
protocols using CasperFDR.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, mobiles are powerful and interesting devices that can do more than just a phone call. The Internet
has become a popular platform where mobiles are increasingly used to communicate with the outside world.
In the last decade or so, a promising technology called Near Field Communication (NFC) [50] was invented.
NFC is believed to be the very dream-like technology that allows mobiles to communicate with nearby
objects if they are in the vicinity of each other. NFC-based mobiles are an emerging technology changing
the way we communicate with objects. NFC as a new communication channel, has serious implications and
dramatic possible applications for future endeavors. For instance, payments, tickets and coupons can be
exchanged just by waving the NFC-based mobile at the point of sale. In 2011, Google announced its first
NFC mobile wallet1. With this system, people are able to store their credit cards in their mobile phones. It
can be used with any contactless card merchants, which currently exist in a variety of shops.
On the other hand, the security of NFC has become a critical issue, especially as many of NFC applica-
tions are sensitive and require proper security. For example, it has been discovered that Google Wallet has
not encrypted a significant amount of information, with only the 16 digits of the credit card being encrypted
[96]. The unencrypted information could be used for a social engineering attack, for example an intruder
could pretend to be one of the bank’s staff by using this information. The main security problem in NFC, as
with all previous technologies when they started, is that people think it will work as it is expected. However,
this is not completely true. This is due to the fact that unauthorized intruders can go unnoticed by engaging
parties. This unauthorized behaviour may result in fake transactions, losing value (e.g. cash back or free
coffee), unauthorized access or privacy breach. Therefore, investigating NFC security is definitely critical.
The best technique to address NFC threats is by considering issues related to a specific NFC application.
This is important because different applications have different security requirements. Nevertheless, an NFC
application threat may include issues that all NFC applications share. In this thesis, the NFC application
that we focus on to enhance its security is NFC mobile coupon (M-coupon).
1.1 NFC mobile coupon application
Coupons are a well-established way of marketing. They are a good way of establishing a relationship with
customers, or to encourage people to visit the company’s shop with promised bonuses (discounts, points,
free coffee, etc.).
Coupons can be offered in a paper-based format or electronically. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the main
players in the coupons system are: Issuer of coupons, targeted customers (users), and cashier for cashing
coupons. The issuer of coupons may be a person on the high street distributing copies of a company’s
coupons or an online website. The cashier is situated at a company’s shop, physically or online, which is
used for coupons’ cashing-in.
There are two main phases for coupons systems: The issuing phase, where coupons are issued by trusted
entities, and the cashing phase, where coupons are cashed in. Defining these phases is important, especially
with designing secure electronic coupons. Note that Issuer in the coupon system is the entity that issues
the coupon during the protocol, not the original designer of the coupon e.g. the company.
1http://www.google.com/wallet/
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Figure 1.1: General NFC mobile coupon
There are many advantages for electronic coupons. They are cost-effective, requires no human interaction
at issue and cashing phases, and it is easy to manage information associated with coupons. It can be done
over the internet E-coupon [12, 11, 55, 76, 88] (either by computer or mobile), or over NFC mobile devices
(NFC M-coupons). The main difference between them is that the E-coupons system requires online access
for issuer, users and cashier. However, with M-coupons, normally, there is no online access for the issuer
and the user, which makes it much easier to build and distribute but trickier to secure. M-coupon issuers
may be a smart poster or an NFC tag on a newspaper.
The NFC M-coupon system has a typical scenario, for this see Figure 1.1. Initially, all parties will have
NFC capabilities in order to communicate with each other. Firstly, a user scans his NFC mobile against an
NFC issuer (smart poster, newspaper). Then, a coupon is issued and sent to his mobile. Later, the user
goes to the shop to cash in the coupon with the cashier. The cashier may perform proper authentication
procedures to make sure the user is who he/she is pertaining to be. Finally, the cashier provides the promised
bonus.
1.2 Motivation
NFC M-coupon application has a number of issues, which require attention and can be addressed by meeting
some security requirements. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, these security requirements address two categories
of threats: specific NFC M-coupon threats and a general NFC technology threat that endangers the NFC M-
coupon application (relay attack). The core of this thesis deals with the specific NFC M-coupon threats by
addressing the desirable security requirements through security protocols with a systematic formal approach,
discussed in Section 1.2.1. The remaining part of the thesis addresses the issue of relay attacks and is
discussed in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.1 Formal security analysis, and developing, of NFC mobile coupon protocols
It is very important to design secure protocols for NFC mobile coupon applications for a number of reasons
[1, 12, 21, 87, 99]. Unauthorized issuing of coupons can cause huge losses for a company. The Disney
Company is an example where such losses have occurred 2. It offered, for its customers who spend $65 or
more in one of its physical stores, or over the phone or Internet, a code that allows them to purchase next
time up to $15 without a minimum purchase. In order to redeem the coupon online or over the phone,
customers were asked to provide the coupon’s code. However, the fact that the company did not make any
countermeasures for the risks of double spending or passing the coupons to unauthorized users, caused huge
losses for the company. Codes were distributed among many people and, as a result of this, the company
could not distinguish any more whether the code’s holder is a genuine customer who really spent $65 or
not. The result was that a vast amount of people ended up getting free stuff up to $15, even though they
did not buy anything. Even genuine customers were able to use the coupon multiple times.
Furthermore, the investment in NFC M-coupons is expected to exceed $43 US billion globally by 2016
2http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-964831.html
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Figure 1.2: NFC mobile coupon security requirements
[56]. In addition, according to a survey3, discounts and coupons will drive further the adoption of mobile
payments. Moreover, although NFC has the disadvantage that it requires a complex ecosystem in payment
and ticketing [90], this is not the case in coupons, i.e. an M-coupon would be managed by the company
only; no need for mobile operators or banks. This will make the adoption of M-coupons much quicker than
other applications. Yet, an interesting statement made by the Chief Technology Officer at coupons.com
that “the future for national coupon schemes lies with NFC technology”4, which is quite significant as it
comes from a person who is responsible for coupon’s technologies at a well-known coupon website. All the
above show how M-coupon schemes have a significant value and need a robust security system before the
proliferation and implementation.
In order to address the security concerns surrounding NFC mobile coupons, a number of security pro-
tocols have been proposed in the literature [33, 48, 47, 4]. Part of the protocols deal with getting a coupon
onto a mobile device (issuing phase), and other parts deal with redeeming the coupons (cashing phase), and
all with respect to particular requirements, e.g. whether a coupon can be transferred, whether it can be
used more than once, whether it can be faked etc.
The story of the NFC M-coupon protocols development started with Dominikus et al. when they
proposed the first protocol in the literature [33]. The protocols utilized in Dominikus et al. study were
based on encryption and signatures meeting four basic security requirements:
• No Multiple Cash-in
• No Unauthorized Generation
• No Manipulation
• No Unauthorized Copying
Then, another protocol was proposed by Hsiang et al., [48] where light hash function were used to
meet the same requirements with two additional requirements: Confidentiality and Data Integrity. The
third protocol [47] is a further development of the hash-based protocol carried out by the same authors. In
particular, they used the quadratic residue theorem [85, 22] to enhance the secrecy of the protocol. Issuer’s ID
anonymity is an additional requirement in this protocol. Finally, we propose our protocol that we developed
in the light of lessons learned from previous protocols. We meet eight refined security requirements:
• Confidentiality
3http://www.nfcworld.com/2011/06/23/38289/survey-discounts-and-coupons-will-drive-adoption-of-mobile-payments/
4http://www.nfcworld.com/2011/03/10/36399/the-future-is-nfc-says-coupons-com-exec/
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• Issuer’s ID anonymity
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Unauthorized Copying
– Not Transferable
– User Authentication
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
Cryptography is an important security mechanism for a NFC M-coupon application. A cryptographic
protocols is an agreed sequence of messages, between two or more parties, of using cryptographic algorithms
to meet some security requirements [70]. However, implementing strong cryptographic algorithms in a pro-
tocol is only half of the solution. In fact, the way encryption is used between entities is the more challenging
part of protocol design. It is quite difficult to establish secure cryptographic protocols even with robust
cryptographic algorithms. Many attacks can be realised during the execution of the cryptographic protocols
just by intercepting and replaying encrypted messages between entities, without any kind of decryption. For
example, the Needham-Schroeder protocol had been regarded as a secure protocol for 17 years (1978-1995),
before an attack was discovered by Gavin Lowe [62]. Therefore, formal verification of cryptographic proto-
cols has been an important field of research [69]. It gives the chance to check mathematically the security
claimed in the protocol and examine its promises.
However, none of the NFC mobile coupons protocols have been formally analysed yet. The first motivat-
ing issue for this thesis is that these protocols need to be formally verified to examine whether they address
their requirements.
Throughout the thesis we illustrate the significance of this research with an airport example. The airport
wants to explore how airline companies can utilise NFC M-coupons. Tags are distributed throughout the
airport and includes a basic M-coupon.
1.2.2 Addressing relay attack
The second motivating issue is addressing the relay attack in NFC mobiles. A relay attack happens when an
intruder extends the distance between two NFC devices while both devices are under the impression they
are close to each other. A dangerous, and yet interesting, aspect of the relay attack is that cryptography
is believed to be not sufficient to address the attack on its own. The relay attack threatens all NFC/RFID
protocols even when the secure protocols have no flaw in them, particularly as the attack circumvents
cryptographic measures anyway. The main challenge of addressing the relay attack is confirming that the
other NFC device is in close proximity.
There are a number of non-cryptographic measures for addressing the relay attack. Distance bounding
protocols (DB) [16, 6, 74, 58, 59, 72, 95, 89, 82, 45, 20, 18] are a group of protocols which measure the
round-trip time taken to transfer a single bit between two engaging parties. This imposes a limit based
on the transmission speed of information. If there is a delay, then this suggests the time taken is more
than needed either by internal or external intruder. The delay indicates an attacker may be relaying the
channel. DB protocols make the relay attack very difficult for the attacker and provide the best solution
so far for the passive contactless cards. DB protocols intend to address internal [16, 27], external [30, 7] or
both internal/external intruders [30]. Finally, DB protocols are not suitable for NFC channels [42].
However, there are some disadvantages with DB protocols. The fact that both parties require addi-
tional time because of computational processes, means that it is difficult to measure the round-trip latency
caused by the different computational process required by both parties. As a result, the real reason for
the latency would not be known; whether it is due to a computational reason or by an attacker relaying
the communication. Because of the computational process problem, the DB protocols have been developed
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with an assumption of a constant computational time. In addition, DB protocols try to address security
requirements in entity authentication beside proximity authentication. Even though entity authentication
requirements are important, they are not the main requirement of the DB protocol. The DB protocols were
invented firstly for addressing proximity authentication, while entity authentication was included to make a
complete protocol that addresses both requirements. The DB protocols address more security requirements
than needed, focusing on improving the less important requirements (i.e. entity authentication). On the
other hand, it is a reasonable argument that it is difficult to apply a normal entity authentication protocol
alongside a proximity proof protocol (bit round-trip) because of the limited choices in a passive contactless
card (e.g. a contactless credit card) and the nature of the proximity proof. However, assuming a constant
computational time, which breaks the core element of measuring the bit round-trip, and focusing on entity
authentication issues are a major disadvantage in these protocols. In theory, the security of DB protocols can
be proven mathematically [13], but applying them in practice is questionable and requires further research.
Finally, DB protocols are not suitable for NFC channels [42].
A different approach is by using an RF “fingerprint” [81, 28] associated with each device, where the
intruder would not be able to have the same “fingerprint” of a proxy device. However, generating a fingerprint
to each device is not a practical solution [38].
Another approach measures the ambient conditions between parties [92]. This is based on the fact that
if the engaging parties are in close proximity, then they should share similar ambient conditions such as
GPS, sound, light or temperature. However, the accuracy of these measures is a major concern. A GPS
signal needs an outside clear environment. Light and sound may be affected by the source’s direction or
interferences. Temperature can be quite similar in two far places. Not to mention if these measures require
additional equipment to measure the ambient conditions. Nonetheless, advantages of the ambient conditions
solutions are that they focus on the main problem by seeking to prove the proximity. Additionally, they
also can be implemented on top of any cryptographic protocols.
The final approach in by engaging the user either by requiring them to carry another device [5] or by
utilising NFC button solutions. The NFC button is used either as a turn on/off NFC function [65, 3] or
measuring the time between showing and pressing buttons showed on both devices [57]. A disadvantage of
this approach is that it relies on the user significantly.
As far as the current relay attack measures are concerned, an ideal solution should feature the following:
1. Response time should not be a critical factor due to the difficulty associated with measuring it.
2. Focusing on the main problem (proving the proximity).
3. The ability to run on top of, or within, normal cryptographic protocols.
4. Easy to apply where no additional equipment is required.
5. Accurate in detecting relay attacks.
The above features represent the motivation to develop the NFC User Key Confirmation protocols (NFC
UKC). NFC UKC protocols overcome issues related to the current relay attack countermeasures.
1.3 Contributions and overview
An overview of the thesis with the contributions in Figure 1.3 where boxes in bold are the contribution.
The thesis is divided into two main key contributions.
• Formal Security Analysis of NFC Mobile Coupons Protocols:
The first contribution related to the NFC M-coupon protocols, left branch in Figure 1.3. Related
contributions are as follows:
1. A Formal Framework for Security Analysis of NFC Mobile Coupon Protocols, using formal
methods (CasperFDR). The framework aims to check whether NFC M-coupon protocols address
their security requirements. It also includes formal definitions and the capturing of the NFC
M-coupon requirements, and how these can be applied to a variety of protocols.
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2. Contributing toward shaping the NFC security requirements.
3. Formal security analysis, and modelling, of six NFC M-coupon protocols (four were in the
literature and two are new) in accordance with the framework. A number of vulnerabilities were
identified and addressed formally. Analysed protocols are as follows:
– Dominikus et al. protocol [33]:
∗ Simple
∗ Advanced
– Hsiang et al. (hash-based) protocol [48]
– Hsiang et al. (QR-based) protocol [47]
– Marketing-based protocol [4]:
∗ Footfall
∗ Premium
4. Propose new NFC mobile coupon protocols, the Marketing-based:
– Footfall
– Premium
5. Customised use of CasperFDR:
– A systematic approach for using the tool for capturing various security properties.
– Introducing alternative, yet equivalent, ways for modelling some non-standard part of the
protocols such as NFC specific assumptions.
We published all work in this section as follows:
– A. Alshehri and J. A. Briffa, “Modelling and analysis of NFC mCoupon protocol,” in 9th Annual
PhD Conference (CompConf 2012), Department of Computing, University of Surrey, 2012.
– A. Alshehri, J. A. Briffa, S. Schneider, and S. Wesemeyer, “Formal security analysis of NFC
m-coupon protocols using CasperFDR,” in Near Field Communication (NFC), 2013 5th Interna-
tional Workshop on, 2013, pp. 1–6.
– A. Alshehri and S. Schneider, “Formal security analysis and improvement of a hash-based
NFC m-coupon protocol,” in 12th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference
(CARDIS 2013), 2013.
– A. Alshehri and S. Schneider, “Formally defining NFC m-coupon requirements, with a case
study,” in Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST), 2013 8th International Con-
ference for, Dec 2013, pp. 52–58.
– A. Alshehri and S. Schneider, A Tutorial on Cracking and Improving Cryptographic Protocols
, 7th Saudi Students Scientific Conference-UK 2014.
– A. Alshehri, and S. Schneider, “A Formal Framework for Security Analysis of NFC Mobile
Coupon Protocols,” Journal of Computer Security, under review.
• User Key Confirmation protocols:
The second contribution is related to addressing the relay attack, the right branch in Figure 1.3. We
develop three NFC User Key Confirmation (UKC) Protocols to address the NFC relay attack in NFC
mobiles. Related contributions are as follows::
1. Propose three NFC UKC protocols:.
– The UKC protocol in card emulation mode.
– The UKC protocol in peer-to-peer mode.
– The UKC protocol in reader/writer mode.
2. Formal security analysis, and modeling, of the three NFC UKC protocols.
3. Customised use of CasperFDR:
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– Introducing ways for modeling some non-standard part of the protocols.
We have submitted the work of this section as:
• A. Alshehri, and S. Schneider, “Addressing NFC Relay Attack: NFC User Confirmation Protocols,”
International Journal of RFID Security and Cryptography (IJRFIDSC).
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Near Field Communication
2.1.1 NFC technology
NFC is a standard-based Radio Frequency (RF) communication link technology that can be embedded into
any device (computers, mobiles, PDA, TV, printers, etc.), in order to allow data to be exchanged between
devices that are normally less than 10 cm apart [37]. NFC has become more prevalent in mobile phones
as a majority of people have got one. For example, NFC is the technology that enables people to make
payments, at the supermarket or the train station, just by waving their mobile at the point of sale.
NFC is not a new idea. It is the logical evolution of ISO/IEC 14443 contactless card technology [51, 54,
52, 53], which allows contactless communication between cards and readers, through a RF field when they
are close to each other. Nowadays, contactless technology is used in a variety of industries such as banking
and transport. It is faster and more convenient than traditional contact cards1. Figure 2.1 shows the basic
NFC architecture in mobiles [67]. The components are as follows:
• Applications downloaded on the mobile.
• NFC module: Built in or external antenna that enables the mobile to communicate with other devices.
• Secure Element (SE): The NFC secure element is the trusted security component, used for secure
execution of sensitive application and information, e.g. encryption keys, and has a restricted access
control. Nonetheless, not all applications need access to the secure element.
NFC mobile operates in three different modes. As shown in Figure 2.2, NFC mobiles can operate in
three different NFC modes determined by the application used [25]:
• Card Emulation Mode: the NFC mobile emulates a contactless card and communicates with an NFC
reader, such as payment and ticketing contactless cards. This mode uses the existing standard ISO
14443 [51, 52, 53, 54].
• Reader and Writer Mode: the NFC mobile acts as a reader and communicates with a passive RFID/NFC
tag. The NFC mobile is able to read and write on contactless objects. This mode uses the existing
standard ISO 14443 as well.
• Peer-to-Peer Mode: In this mode the NFC mobile can exchange information with another NFC mobile.
In this mode it uses the NFC standard ISO 18092 [50].
NFC mobiles can be active or passive. NFC relies on the RF field as a transmission medium. If the NFC
mobile emulates a reader, it must generate the RF field to power the other device, see the arrows’ direction
in Figure 2.2. If it emulates a card, then it has to wait for the RF and a command. However, in peer-to-peer
1www.visapaywave.com
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NFC communication, mobiles can be a reader and/or a card. Therefore, things have been defined from a
slightly different perspective [50]. There are two methods of how NFC mobiles can communicate with other
devices. This depends on whether the device generates its own RF field during communicating. Thus, there
is an active mode if the device has a power source to generate its own RF field, and there is a passive mode
if it has no source of power and relies on the power of another device to be able to engage in communication.
The passive mode is the default state for all NFC devices. In addition, if a number of cards are presented
in the reader’s RF field, a reader (active NFC) must choose only one card (NFC devices). The device that
starts the communication is called an ‘Initiator’. This must be done in the active mode as the ’initiator’
needs a source of power. The response device is called the ‘Target’, and is not required to be active as it
does not need a source of power.
RF anti-collision [50] is performed by the initiator. NFC devices must check for any existing RF fields
before they begin generating their own RF field. In the case where there is no RF field, the “initiator”
promptly generates one and begins communication. The other device is either passive or active. If both
devices are active, then both of them perform RF anti-collision before sending data.
2.1.2 NFC Applications
The fact that NFC can perform three modes of operation has inspired a significant number of possible
applications. In addition, many passive devices can now be interactive, NFC enabled, devices.
NFC is just a communication link. Therefore, it is hard to mention all its possible applications. However,
NFC applications could be categorised into the following classes [71]:
• Contactless Token: When applications use NFC to emulate passive tokens, such as smart card or a
RFID label. The main feature of these applications is that neither a source of power, nor a link to the
device CPU, is required. However, the contactless tokens cannot run a complex protocol, since they
only deal with limited computing power. Ideally, they store data to be read by NFC active devices.
An example of such an application is a URL stored in an NFC tag, which gives a direct link to a
website address.
• Ticketing/Micro Payment: When applications use NFC to transfer more valuable information, such
as ticket or micro payment. This can be a contactless smart card but can also be a mobile phone.
The capability to perform complex protocols is normally required. The NFC secure element becomes
important here. The NFC mobile coupon protocols are an example of the Ticketing/Micro Payment
application. It requires the capability to perform complex protocols and it runs on the NFC mobile
phone platform.
• Device Pairing: NFC is used to establish a connection between devices. For example, it can be used
to transfer initial Bluetooth settings between two devices, just by bringing the two devices close to
each other.
2.2 NFC security
NFC is a wireless communication. There are no security measures provided by the NFC ISO 18092 standard
at the NFC communication link [71], i.e. it is determined by the implementers. This section discusses threats
and attacks related to NFC.
NFC threats can be categorised by highlighting the three main information security aspects CIA (Con-
fidentiality, Integrity, Availability). Note that these definitions are considered from a security protocol
aspect:
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the security property of maintaining the secrecy of information
throughout the protocol. Confidentiality is violated by a number of attacks such as eavesdropping and
skimming : If an attacker listens to a communication, this is eavesdropping. Eavesdropped messages
may include sensitive information which the intruder is not allowed to see . If an attacker interacts
with the card without a user’s permission, this is skimming, which is different from cloning normal
contact cards. The feasibility of such attacks also depends on a variety of other factors [44], which are
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out of scope. This can be done by designing new equipment, or using equipment already designed,
such as OpenPCD 2. ISO 14443 is vulnerable to skimming attacks from around 30 cm and eavesdrop-
ping attacks from 3.5 m [41]. Related threats are privacy attacks, e.g. tracking and tracing, and a
compromise of the encryption key.
• Integrity: Integrity is the security property of maintaining the accuracy of information throughout the
protocol. Integrity is violated by a number of attacks. Replay attack : the attacker replays a previous
message. Replay attacks violate the integrity of the protocol from the aspect that the other party
would finish the protocol with the wrong belief. Data integrity : such as message reconstruction, data
modification and data insertion. Relay attack [38]: the reader cannot distinguish between the real
token and the proxy-token [43] where the attacker can pretend to be any card if he has a relay channel
with the genuine, victim card.
The integrity of NFC tags is critical. An example of an attack is when a smart poster should direct you
to X website but, after manipulation by an intruder, it directs you to Y website [71]. NDEF ‘Signature
Record Type’ [73] is a countermeasure specification by NFC Forum for verifying tag content. However,
Roland et al. in [83] have discovered a vulnerability in this signature. The attack combines two halves
of different tags’ signatures to make a new signature. This shows that integrity still can be violated
even with applying cryptographic measures.
• Availability: Availability is the security property of providing information whenever it is needed
throughout the protocol. Availability is violated if the availability of an NFC device is prevented by
the attacker e.g. Denial of Service attack (DoS).
Countermeasures need to be in place to address these threats and attacks. The requirement for robust
security in NFC in general has been emphasised in the literature [44, 71]. NFC-SEC standards [36, 35]
enable two NFC devices, in Peer-to-Peer mode, to establish a secure channel. However, they do not provide
entity authentication and are not suitable for applications requiring specific security mechanisms.
For any NFC application, cryptography is the ideal measure to address security threats, such as confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability. On the other hand, cryptography cannot address the relay attack on
its own since the attack circumvents cryptographic measures. The relay attack measures are discussed in
more depth in Chapter 9, including a proposed solution.
2.3 Cryptography
Cryptography underpins secure communications. In order to use cryptography, there are two questions that
must be considered. The first concern is which cryptographic algorithms should be used (cryptographic
primitives), and the second is how to use these in a secure protocol (security protocols). In this thesis,
the concern is with the second question: how to use cryptography in a protocol, with assumed secure
cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, the main function of cryptographic primitives is described below:
• Symmetric Cryptography : uses a shared key between entities, say Alice and Bob. Both Alice and
Bob have the same key used for encryption and decryption (which opens the encrypted message to
its original unencrypted form), e.g. DES and IDEA [70]. The addressed security properties are
Confidentiality and Integrity.
• Asymmetric Cryptography : every entity has two different keys, Public and Private keys. So, anyone can
encrypt messages using Alice’s public key and Alice will be the only who one can decrypt messages with
her private key, e.g. ElGamal public-key encryption [70]. In addition to addressing Confidentiality,
Asymmetric Cryptography is used to address Integrity with a slightly different use called Digital
Signature.
– Digital Signature: is a digital analogue of a real signature which guarantees where a message has
come from, e.g. DSA and RSA [70].
2www.openpcd.org
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• Hash Function: is a one-way algorithm which takes an arbitrary block of data and gives a fixed size
unique string of data. The addressed security property is Integrity, e.g. SHA-1 and MD5 [70].
• Nonce: is a Number Used Once (random number) used for message’s freshness (Integrity). A nonce
might be used for confidentiality as well (e.g. using it in the generation of a new key).
• Cryptographic Protocol : describes an agreed way of using the above cryptographic algorithms in mes-
sages exchanged between entities to address some security requirements, e.g. entity authentication
protocols [70].
2.4 Security protocol analysis
Attacks can occur during the process of implementing cryptographic primitives in a security protocol. This
section discusses how security protocols can be analysed to check whether they meet the necessary security
requirements
2.4.1 Approaches
An analysis of the security protocol is categorised into the following approaches [78, 69, 2]:
• Computational approach
• Formal methods approach
The main difference between the two approaches is the way cryptographic primitives are modelled. In
the computational approach, cryptographic primitives are modelled as functions dealing with strings of bits
in which the intruder is able to try and break them i.e. cryptanalysis. In contrast, the intruder in the formal
methods approach does not perform cryptanalysis, but has full control of the communication medium. The
only way for encryption/decryption is when the intruder holds the appropriate key. This assumption in
the formal methods approach is commonly known as the perfect encryption assumption [32]. The formal
methods approach is much easier to automate than the computational approach. With regard to this thesis,
the analysis tool falls into the formal methods approach.
The formal methods approach uses a common way to find vulnerabilities. First, a system and its
specifications are modelled as formulas of logic. Then, a test is performed to check a claim that the
system and its specifications are related. Finally, the result is either true (i.e. error-free) or false where
a counterexample is generated to show how the claim is violated. In the security protocol context, the
system is the security protocol, the specifications are the security requirements and the counterexample is
the attack.
Tools based on the formal methods approach fall into three main approaches:
1. Belief logic [17, 39, 15, 66]: This approach was the first attempt to automate the verification of security
protocols. BAN Logic [17] is the most significant belief logic, where beliefs of entities can be described
and evaluated through inference rules. Then, based on the evaluation process, a final statement is
concluded whether the protocol is correct or not. However, there are some disadvantages, e.g. it
only checks authentication properties, and assumes only honest parties are engaged in the protocol.
GNY (Gong, Needham and Yahalom) [39] is an extended logic that address some disadvantages of the
BAN logic. However, it becomes more complicated and still only checks authentication properties.
BGNY is an extended logic of GNY which has been automated by software [15, 66]. Nevertheless,
only authentication properties can be checked.
2. Theorem proving [98, 23, 24, 94, 93, 29, 14, 77] is an approach that verifies the security through a
formal proof. Tools based on theorem proving fall into two branches: Higher Order Logic and First
Order Logic, such as: HOL theorem prover, the ACL2 theorem prover and Isabelle theorem prover.
However, this approach is time consuming as it is not fully automated and does not provide good
support for flaw detection.
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3. State exploration: Vulnerabilities are found in the state exploration approach by exploring all possible
traces of a protocol to check whether a property holds. Tools based on state exploration fall into two
branches: Model checking is a method that identifies vulnerabilities in the given model by checking
if a security requirement is violated. However, the model checking approach does not establish if the
protocol is really correct. This limitation motivates the second approach, the Strand Spaces approach.
Nonetheless, the majority of tools are based on the state exploration approach. With this in mind,
the analysis tool utilised in this thesis falls into the model checking approach. There are a number of
tools based on the state exploration approach such as Scyther [26], AVISPA [97], OFMC [8], Athena
[91], ProVerif [10], SMV [68] and BMC [9].
2.4.2 Model checking tools
Table 2.1: Comparison of formal model checking tools [69]
Tool name Publicly Available Falsification
Verification
Termination
Bounded Unbounded
CasperFDR Yes Yes Yes No Yes
OFMC Yes Yes Yes No Yes
CL-Atse Yes Yes Yes No Yes
SATMC Yes Yes Yes No Yes
TA4SP Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Avispa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HERMES Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Interrogator No Yes Yes No Yes
NRL Protocol analyser No No No Yes Yes
Brutus No Yes Yes No Yes
Murϕ Yes Yes Yes No Yes
ProVerif Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Athena(Bounded) No Yes Yes No Yes
Athena(Unbounded) No Yes No Yes No
Scyther Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.1 illustrates a comparison of formal model checking tools [69], where falsification highlights when
a tool finds a flaw and gives a response, bounded verification means the protocol is analysed within a finite
system, unbounded verification means the protocol is analysed within an infinite system and termination
means whether the tool ends successfully or not. As suggested in Table 2.1, the tools that satisfy all features
are AVISPA and Scyther.
Scyther
Scyther [26] is a tool, developed by Cas Cremers, for security protocols verification. Figure 2.3 shows a
Scyther modelling script of a protocol of two messages aiming to authenticate Bob to Alice:
1- Alice → Bob : {A , NA , KAB }PKB
2- Bob → Alice : {NA}KAB
where:
A: Alice’s ID.
B: Bob’s ID.
NA: Alice’s nonce (number used once).
KAB : session key.
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// The protocol description
protocol simple(I,R)
{
role I
{
fresh kir: SessionKey;
fresh ni: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,kir,ni}pk(R) );
recv_2(R,I, {ni,R}kir );
claim_i1(I,Secret,kir);
claim_i2(I, Commit, R, kir);
}
role R
{
var kir: SessionKey;
var ni: Nonce;
recv_1(I,R, {I,kir,ni}pk(R) );
claim_r2(R, Running, I, kir);
send_2(R,I, {ni,R}kir );
claim_r1(R,Secret,kir);
}
}
Figure 2.3: Scyther modelling of the illustrating example
PKB: Bob’s public key.
Scyther seems to be the easiest tool for modelling if we compare it to AVISPA and CasperFDR. In
Figure 2.3, Alice is modelled as role I (Initiator) and her role is defined between the two brackets. Alice
generates a fresh session key kir and nonce ni. Alice’s action is that she sends the first encrypted message to
Bob R(responder), then in turn receives (recv) the second message from Bob. Bob is defined in the second
section role R. He will accept variables (var kir) as session keys, and ni as a nonce. The first action for Bob
is that he will receive a message that appears to be sent by Alice, then sends the second message to Alice.
The secrecy of the session key can be captured by placing claims, for both entities, at the end of the
protocol. The authentication is captured by placing a Running event after Bob receives the first message
indicating that he is running the protocol with Alice, apparently. Then, placing a Commit event at the end
of Alice’s run indicates that she has completed a run of the protocol apparently with Bob. This approach
is quite similar to CasperFDR approach which will be explained in more detail in chapter 3.
Scyther found an attack. Bob’s claim of the session key secrecy does not hold. Scyther generates a
graphical user interface of the attack trace as shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Scyther interfaces: protocol model and attack trace
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AVISPA
AVISPA [97] (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) is a push-button tool
for the automated validation of the Internet protocols. Protocols are specified in HLPSL language (High
Level Protocols Specification Language), and are analysed by four model checking tools: OFMC, AtSe,
SATMC and TA4SP. To get a flavour of the tool, Figure 2.5 illustrates modelling, and an attack, of the
Needham Schroeder Public-Key Protocol available from the AVISPA web interface3:
1- Alice → Bob : {A , NA} PKB
2- Bob → Alice : {NA , NB}PKA
3- Alice → Bob : {NB} PKB
where:
A: Alice’s ID.
NA: Alice’s nonce (number used once).
NB: Bob’s nonce (number used once).
PKA: Alice’s public key.
PKB: Bob’s public key.
Why CasperFDR?
This section justifies the use of the analysis tool of this thesis CasperFDR [64, 46, 86]. It also discusses its
related disadvantages and possible affects.
The advantages of CasperFDR fall into the following aspects:
1. It allows modification of the intruder’s power on every channel (i.e. each message) of the protocol.
Such settings are needed in our work on NFC protocols to capture some behaviour in the analysed
protocols. This is not possible in AVISPA and Scyther, while in CasperFDR it is a default setting.
2. Accessing the original CSP code which allows direct modification of the model when appropriate.
3. The ability to use the tool for more advanced analysis such as capturing various security requirements
in NFC mobile coupon. This is also possible in AVISPA and Scyther.
4. It features various automated and robust security specifications, e.g. Agreement, Noninjectiveagree-
ment etc. as they will be explained in the next chapter. This is also provided in AVISPA and Scyther
but not as powerfully as in CasperFDR, as discussed previously in 1.
On the other hand, as Table 2.1 suggests, the limitation of CasperFDR is that it only analyses the protocol
within a bounded, finite system. CasperFDR checks vulnerabilities within the limited given system, not like
some other tools which explore attacks in an unbounded system such as AVISPA and Scyther. However, our
NFC threat model does not require such feature where the intruder, unlike in the Internet, is assumed to have
a very limited access to engaging parties as we will explain in Section 3.2. A less significant disadvantage
is that even though CasperFDR provides “Alice-Bob” diagram of attacks, it does not provide a graphical
interface as in AVISPA and Scyther.
3http://www.avispa-project.org/web-interface/basic.php
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(a) AVISPA interface
(b) Attack trace
Figure 2.5: AVISPA
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Chapter 3
The CasperFDR Approach
3.1 Introduction
Communicating Sequential Processes CSP [46], with its model checker Failures Divergence Refinement
(FDR), has been proven to be an effective method in analysing the security of protocols [86]. However,
modelling protocols in CSP is not a trivial task. Gavin Lowe developed CasperFDR [64]. CasperFDR is, as
shown in Figure 3.1, a tool that allows the user to write an abstract description of a security protocol, then
the tool produces code in the CSP language, and directly checks it with FDR2.
CasperFDR has been used to analyse a huge number of protocols [34, 75, 60], which proves its capability
of finding vulnerabilities, and makes it a robust CSP model producer. In addition, research was done on the
formal verification of the Australian E-passport system, using CasperFDR [75]. This scheme is based on
the contactless card reader standard ISO 14443. It confirmed existing gaps in the literature and discovered
a new vulnerability. Another study has been done on formal verification of the hash based RFID security
protocol using CasperFDR [60]. They have analysed existing protocols, which they found to be vulnerable.
This suggested a new hash based protocol, which is formally checked by CasperFDR. Finally, research has
been done on formal verification of IEEE802 wireless secure protocols, using CasperFDR [80, 61, 79].
CasperFDR performs a refinement check of the protocol against its requirements. When refinement fails,
then it provides a trace which shows how the property fails, which corresponds to an attack. Moreover,
CasperFDR manages algebraic equivalences where attacks against these algebraic properties are considered
and captured in CasperFDR.
CasperFDR is a formal method tool which supports symbolic protocol analysis in the Dolev-Yao model
[32]. The best way to illustrate the CasperFDR approach is by a simple example.
The contribution made by this chapter toward the literature is its illustration modelled from the underlin-
ing theory angle (CSP aspect), which is beyond the knowledge required for modelling using the CasperFDR
tool (black-box approach). Modelling protocols in CasperFDR requires only an abstract description of the
protocol and the security requirements to be checked. Then, CasperFDR provides the results detailing
whether an attack was found or not. We call this a black-box approach, as the underlying models are not
shown to the user. In this chapter, this point is considered by illustrating the modelling from the underlying
theory perspective. This is important in enabling a black-box user to become more powerful in protocol
analysis using CasperFDR and modelling the protocol and its requirements in a precise approach. Therefore,
this chapter facilitates a case study for a “black box” CasperFDR user to become a more powerful analyser.
3.2 CasperFDR threat model
The threat model used in the formal analysis is the Dolev-Yao model [32], see Figure 3.2, which assumes
no encrypted message can be decrypted without the decryption key, thus the intruder does not perform any
cryptanalysis. However, he or she has full control of the network traffic, i.e. an ability to block, replay,
redirect, spoof and duplicate messages, and tries to break the security protocol from what has been learned.
In addition, since NFC is a wireless communication, there is a limit on how many times the intruder can
access engaging parties. Therefore, all the participants (the user, the issuer and the cashier) are engaging
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Figure 3.2: Dolev-Yao threat model
in the protocol only once. The intruder does not have unlimited access to the parties but has a minimum
number of accesses to try attacking the protocol.
The analysis threat model does not include proximity. Therefore, the Relay attack is not considered in
our analysis since it is a general attack against NFC technology [38]. Relay attack is a well-known attack that
manipulates the proximity factor between entities. Cryptographic measures are believed to be not sufficient
for addressing the attack on its own. The main danger of the relay attack is the fact that the attack
works even with secure protocols. Thus, it is warranted to assume that there are some non-cryptographic
techniques for addressing NFC relay attacks, discussed in [38], and in which case relay attacks are not a
primary concern of the formal analysis. However, we propose a solution to address relay attacks after the
formal security analysis of the NFC M-coupon protocols.
3.3 Illustrating example
Our illustrating protocol is a two message protocol which aims to authenticate Bob to Alice:
1- Alice → Bob : {A , NA , KAB }PKB
2- Bob → Alice : {NA}KAB
Message 1 sent by Alice to Bob contains Alice’s identity, Nonce (number used once) and a session key
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KAB, encrypted with Bob’s public key. Then, Bob sends message 2 by encrypting the Nonce (NA) with the
session key. Alice authenticates Bob based on the fact that since message 1 is encrypted by Bob’s public
key, he is the only one who can extract the session key and the nonce and send message 2. At the end of
the protocol both Alice and Bob believe the session key KAB is concealed.
3.4 CasperFDR modelling
Figure 3.3 shows the Casper script of the illustration protocol model.
There are eight sections which can be considered from two main perspectives, protocol definition and
system definition:
• The Protocol Definition:
The first four sections give a general description of the protocol:
# Protocol description
Defines the exchanged messages within the protocol. The first line means A starts the protocol with
B, maybe through A’s user or the environment. The other lines are the messages of the protocol.
# Free variables
Defines any variables, or functions, used in the protocol description.
# Processes
Defines every agent in the protocol description, as CSP processes, including their initial knowledge.
# Specifications
Defines the requirements of the protocol which will be checked. Having modelled the exchanged
messages between entities, the claimed authentication and secrecy properties are checked using the
following claims (where B is Bob and A is Alice):
Agreement(Bob,Alice,[NA])
Secret(Bob, KAB,[Alice])
The Agreement specification means it will check whether Bob is authenticated to Alice and they have
both agreed on the Nonce NA. The Secret specification is checking whether the key KAB accepted by
Bob is secret between Bob and Alice. Here, Bob is the one who claims the secret. One does not have
to check what Alice’s belief about the key KAB is i.e. Secret(Alice, KAB,[Bob]), as she is the one
who generated it.
• The System Definition:
CasperFDR, or CSP, requires a specific system to be checked within the protocol e.g. how many
agents take B’s role or how many sessions B can engage in the protocol. The defined system must be
finite, otherwise the tool will crash due to the state explosion problem or the analysis will never finish.
Identifying a particular system requires these four steps:
# Actual variables
Similar to ‘Free Variables’ above but explicitly specifying the names of the variables.
# Functions
Functions used in the protocol are defined here.
# System definition
Defines the instances of the roles acting by agents in the protocol and how many times they can engage
in the protocol.
# The intruder
Defines the initial intruder’s knowledge.
3.5 The CSP view of CasperFDR modelling
Understanding how these specifications are captured underneath CasperFDR, the CSP view, is important
if one wants precise descriptions of how claimed properties are modelled in a specific application, as shown
in later chapters. Here, an example will be given from a CSP point of view.
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#Free variables
A,B: Agent
na : Nonce
PK :Agent -> PublicKey
SK :Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (kab,kab), (PK, SK)
kab : SessionKey
#Processes
INITIATOR(A,B,na, kab) knows PK
RESPONDER(B,A) knows PK, SK(B)
#Protocol description
0. -> A : B
1. A -> B : {A,na,kab}{PK(B)}
2. B -> A : {na}{kab}
#Specification
Agreement(B,A,[na])
Secret(B, kab , [A])
#Actual variables
Alice, Bob, Mallory : Agent
Na, Nm : Nonce
Kab,Km : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kab,Kab), (Km,Km)
#Functions
symbolic PK, SK
#System
INITIATOR(Alice,Bob,Na,Kab)
RESPONDER(Bob,Alice)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice, Bob, Mallory, Nm, Km,PK, SK(Mallory)}
Figure 3.3: CasperFDR modelling of the illustrating example
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Initially, Alice and Bob are modelled as independent CSP processes. Every agent in the protocol is
modelled from their different views of the protocol including new events. These events are Running, Commit
and Claim Secret which are injected in the protocol. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the general concept of placing
these events in a protocol which will define what security properties are expected, especially at a particular
point during a run of the protocol. The agents are allowed to express their belief in the protocol by these
events. Figure 3.4b shows how authentication is captured by CasperFDR. Running allows the authenticated
agent, Alice, to say “I am running the protocol with Bob”. The Running event is performed before the last
message is sent by Alice, which means she has progressed at least as far as the prior message sent by her.
The Commit event is performed after the last message in the protocol done by the verified agent (Bob),
which allows Bob to say “I have finished the protocol with Alice”. Figure 3.4c shows how secrecy is captured
by CasperFDR. After Alice sends a secret message, she claims a value that is secret and only known by Bob.
Figure 3.5 applies this concept to the illustrated example. The final structure of the protocol emerges
through the following steps, where events are tagged by >:
1. Alice’s view of the protocol (as initiator):
Msg 1: Alice sends to Bob : {A , NA , KAB }PKB
Msg 2: Alice receives from Bob : {NA}KAB
> Msg 3: Alice Commit to Bob : NA
2. Bob’s view of the protocol (as responder):
Msg 1: Bob receives from Alice : {A , NA , KAB }PKB
> Msg 2: Bob Running with Alice : NA
Msg 3: Bob sends to Alice : {NA}KAB
> Msg 4: Bob Claim Secret with Alice : KAB
3. Running the final protocol in the Dolev-Yao intruder model.
Capturing authentication between Alice and Bob in the protocol is done by utilising the Running and
the Commit events. In Figure 3.5b after message 1, Bob performs the Running event, which means Bob
has apparently began running the protocol with Alice. Then, Alice will perform the Commit event at the
end of her part of the protocol, which means Alice has finished a run of the protocol with Bob. Alice could
make sure she was running the protocol with Bob based on the fact that if Alice reaches the Commit event,
then Bob must have reached the Running event beforehand. Launching an attack relies on the possibility of
the intruder, without taking Bob’s role, to engineer a trace of the protocol in which Alice runs the Commit
event without a corresponding Running event from Bob.
For secrecy, only the Claim Secret event is used by Alice and Bob. Figure 3.5b only shows when Bob
performs Claim Secret event. An attack is launched if the intruder could break this claim by finding a trace
of the protocol in which the intruder knows a claimed secret, without taking Alice’s or Bob’s roles.
The Running, Commit and Claim Secret events can also contain more information specific to the agree-
ment required between the participants. They are constructed by
Agent.Agent.Message
For example Running.Bob.Alice.NA, means Bob starts a run of the protocol, apparently with Alice, using
nonce NA.
The CasperFDR analysis finds no attack on authentication, but there is an attack on secrecy. Figure
3.5c illustrates how an intruder can obtain a session key that Bob believes is secret with Alice. Anyone can
generate message 1 since Bob’s public key is publicly known. The intruder impersonates Alice by including
Alice’s identity, making Bob believe the session key KMB is secret with Alice. A trace of the attack which
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Figure 3.4: The concept of authentication and secrecy events in a protocol
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Figure 3.5: Placing authentication and secrecy events in the illustrating example
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the intruder was able to engineer is:
Msg 1: Intruder Alice sends to Bob : {A , NM , KMB }PKB
Msg 2: Bob receives from Alice : {A , NM , KMB }PKB
Msg 3: Bob Running with Alice : NM
Msg 4: Bob sends to Alice : {NM}KMB
Msg 5: Intruder Alice receives from Bob :{NM}KMB
Msg 6: Bob Claim Secret with Alice : KMB
Msg 7: Intruder Alice knows : KMB
Msg 6 claims that Bob thinks that KMB is a secret shared only with Alice, but Msg 7 shows that the
Intruder is aware of it.
3.6 Hierarchy of Authentication and secrecy
CasperFDR provides different layers of authentication and secrecy [63]. Authentication specifications are
illustrated in Figure 3.6, and Secrecy specifications in Figure 3.7.
Aliveness: Illustrated in Figure 3.6b. Aliveness is the weakest form of authentication specifications. It
guarantees to Bob aliveness of Alice. Aliveness means if Bob thinks he has successfully completed a run of
the protocol with Alice, then Alice has previously been running the protocol. The meaning of “then Alice
has previously been running the protocol” is that Alice has engaged in the protocol until the last message
that Alice has sent. However, Alice may have thought she was running the protocol with someone other
than Bob.
An example is the Linux command Ping. Ping is used to check if a particular server is alive. So if we
do ’ping Google.com’ then it will send a message to Google.com and see if it gets a response. However,
Google.com does not know the requesting agent. Thus, it does not matter if the server thinks the request
came from someone else, it does not have to agree on the participants of the protocol run.
Weak agreement: Illustrated in Figure 3.6c. WeakAgreement includes the definition of theAliveness
specification, and it is a stronger specification in which it adds the condition that Alice has agreed she was
running the protocol with Bob. However, Alice and Bob may disagree on their role played in relation to the
protocol. An example of such protocol is when Alice and Bob both play the initiator and the responder role
simultaneously.
Non-injective agreement: Illustrated in Figure 3.6d. NonInjectiveAgreement includes the definition of
the Weak agreement specification, and it is a stronger specification in which it adds the condition that Alice
and Bob agree as to which roles each was taking, and also agree upon some of the date items used in the
exchanged messages. However, there is no guarantee of a one-to-one relationship between Alice and Bob i.e.
Bob may believe that he has completed two runs, whereas Alice has only engaged in one of them. Each run
made by one participant is matched by a run from another, albeit these can also overlap. For example, two
“Commit” events may correspond to the same “Running” event.
A protocol example is a multiple access by a client to service providers. Because the client has been
authenticated by a trusted third party, it can access a number of times just by one authentication.
Agreement: Illustrated in Figure 3.6e. Agreement includes the Non-injective agreement specification, and
it is the strongest specification. It adds the condition that there is a one-to-one relationship between Alice
and Bob i.e. each run of Bob corresponds to a unique run of Alice. For instance, a one-to-one relationship
is required in financial protocols.
There are two different forms of secrecy specifications:
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Figure 3.6: Hierarchy of authentication
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Figure 3.8: Placing authentication and secrecy events in a three parties protocol
Secret: Illustrated in Figure 3.7b. Secret tests if an intruder could know a claimed secret value after a
complete run of the protocol. An example of such specification is the session key shown in the illustrated
example above, where if an intruder compromises the session key in the middle of the protocol, this does
not count as an attack. This is because the session key has not been accepted yet by both parties. The
importance of its secrecy comes at the end of the protocol (message 2).
Strong Secret: Illustrated in Figure 3.7c. StrongSecret includes the Secret specification and a testing
of the claimed secret even during the protocol run. This specification is required in some protocols where
compromising a value even in the middle of the protocol does count as an attack e.g. a credit card number.
3.7 More on placing security events in CasperFDR
Normally, the Running event is inserted at a place just before the last message sent by Alice, and the
Commit event is inserted at the end of the protocol run done by Bob. Figure 3.8, a and b, illustrate this
role in a three parties protocol.
However, CasperFDR inserts these events in a more realistic and precise way, see 3.8c. When CasperFDR
performs both the Running event and message 1 (M1) in the same time, this allows Alice to express her
belief of running the protocol with Bob, while also simultaneously sending the last message, M1. CasperFDR
does the same with the Commit event and message 2 (M2). This feature is an additional advantage for
CasperFDR.
3.8 Channels
CasperFDR allows for the adjustment of the intruder’s ability on any link carrying messages of the protocol
[31]. Figure 3.9 illustrates how these channels are defined and then controlled. Definitions of occurred events
are as follow:
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Figure 3.9: Channels in CasperFDR
• send (A.CA.B.m): means agent A sends message m, intended for agent B, in a connection identified
by A as CA. All NFC M-coupon parties will use this event to send their messages.
• receive (B.CB.A.m): means agent B receives message m, apparently from agent A, in a connection
identified by B as CB. All NFC M-coupon parties will use this event to receive messages.
• fake (A.B.CB.m): means the intruder fakes a send of message m to agent B in connection CB with
the identity of honest agent A. CB is either an existing connection or a new one. However, the intruder
must choose the message from those he knows.
• hijack (A.A’.B.B’.CB’.m): means the intruder modifies a previously sent message m and changes the
sender from A to A’, and the receiver from B to B’ so that B’ accepts in a connection CB’. The hijack
event can be used by the intruder in four different ways:
– To replay a message (A.B.CB.m). This is not captured independently.
– To re-ascribe a message (A’.B.CB.m)
– To redirect a message (A.B’.CB.m)
– To both re-ascribe and redirect (A’.B’.CB.m)
Based on these concepts and definitions, every channel (link) in the protocol can be adjusted in the
#Channels section. This is explained by six restriction settings provided by CasperFDR:
1. C (Confidential): the intruder can not eavesdrop messages on this channel. This affects both sender
and receiver. For example, M-coupon is secret on an NFC link, say between the user and the cashier,
from the intruder.
2. NF (No fake): the intruder can not fake messages on this channel, any message received must have
been generated by the claimed sender. This affects the receiver more than the sender. For example,
the intruder is not able to fake an M-coupon to the cashier by himself but the intruder may still be
able to replay it.
3. NRA (No reascribing): the intruder is not able to change the identity of the sender when he/she
hijacks messages. This affects the sender. For example, if the intruder eavesdrops an M-coupon, he or
she can not change the sender’s identity if NRA channel is used to cash the M-coupon at the cashier.
4. NRA- (No honest reascribing): the intruder can only change the identity of the sender to a dishonest
identity when he/she hijacks messages. For example, if the intruder eavesdrops an M-coupon, he can
change the user’s identity to one’s own identity when he or she cashes the M-coupon at the cashier.
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5. NR (No redirecting): the intruder cannot redirect messages i.e. changing the receiver ID. This affects
the receiver more. For example, when the issuer sends the M-coupon to the user, the intruder can not
redirect this message to someone else. However, the intruder can change who it is apparently from.
6. NR- (No honest redirecting): the intruder cannot redirect messages that were sent to honest agents.
The intruder can change the receiver ID only if this message does not include an identity of an honest
agent. For example, the intruder can redirect a message that includes a nonce without the user identity.
The manner these settings are written in CasperFDR is as follows (where numbers are the messages):
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
2 NRA- NR-
This states that the channel used for message 1 of the protocol includes the properties (C, NF, NRA
and NR), and for message 2 includes the properties (NRA and NR-).
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter illustrates the CasperFDR approach from a deep CSP perspective which enables one to capture
the requirements of the NFC mobile coupons protocols, as demonstrated in the next chapter. We practically
demonstrate, and explain, an advance use of CasperFDR, which is beyond the knowledge required to model
using CasperFDR tool (black-box approach). Modelling protocols in CasperFDR requires only an abstract
description of the protocol and necessary security requirements to be checked. Then, CasperFDR provides
the result detailing whether an attack has been found. This is called a black-box approach as the underlying
models are not shown to the user. This approach is important to enable a black-box user to become more
powerful in protocol analysis using CasperFDR. The results of the approach enable a user to model a protocol
and capture its requirements in a very precise way. This approach will be illustrated deeply throughout the
thesis by firstly and formally defining the NFC M-coupon requirements and then testing whether the NFC
M-coupon protocols, including the protocols, satisfy these definitions.
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Chapter 4
Formalising NFC Mobile Coupons
Security Requirements
4.1 Introduction
This chapter mainly focuses on the formal definition of the NFC M-coupon requirements, which is the first
and most important part of the formal analysis. The formal definitions will apply to a variety of protocols
in the following chapters.
The contribution made by this chapter toward the literature is that a formal definition of the NFC
M-coupon requirements and an analysis of the relationship between them is provided. The NFC secu-
rity requirements are shaped, for example, by dividing Unauthorized Copying into two requirements: Not
Transferable and User Authentication. In addition, we introduce an illustrating figure showing how these
requirements are captured in the protocol.
4.2 NFC mobile coupons system
The NFC M-coupon system has a typical scenario, see Figure 4.1. All parties have NFC capability, in order
to communicate with each other. Firstly, a user scans his or her NFC mobile against an NFC issuer (e.g.
a smart poster or newspaper). Then, an M-coupon is issued and sent to his/her mobile by NFC channel.
Later, the user goes to the shop to cash the M-coupon with the cashier by transferring the M-coupon by
NFC channel as well. The cashier may authenticate the user before the cashier provides the bonus. Only
the cashier needs to have online access, whereas the issuer and the user can both be oﬄine.
Userr CashierIssuer
M-coupon
M-coupon
Figure 4.1: General NFC mobile coupon
An M-coupon is a cryptographically secured electronic message with some value. It requires secure
issuing and cashing of the M-coupons, otherwise it can cause huge losses for a company and damage its
reputation.
We illustrate this chapter with an airport example. The airport wants to explore how airline companies
can utilise NFC M-coupons. Tags are distributed throughout the airport and includes a basic M-coupon.
We illustrate, in the following sections, how an M-coupon is becoming stronger and, hence, more useful.
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4.3 NFC M-coupons threat model and security requirements
There are a number of threats that can damage NFC M-coupon protocols. While transferring the M-coupon
via NFC between the issuer and the user, and between the user an the cashier, the intruder may eavesdrop
sensitive information of the M-coupon. The intruder can use this sensitive information to break the NFC
M-coupon protocol. For example, constructing and double spending a new M-coupon or claiming to be
an M-coupon issuer. In order to address these possible threats, eight common security requirements were
suggested in the literature [33, 48, 47, 3] :
• Confidentiality: An unauthorized third party shall not be able to obtain the M-coupon by eaves-
dropping.
• Data Integrity: Any modification of data between the issuer and the cashier must be detected by
the cashier.
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation: The M-coupon must not be issued by unauthorized issuers.
– No Manipulation: The M-coupon shall not stay valid after a manipulation.
• Unauthorized Copying: An attacker shall not be able to produce a valid copy of an M-coupon and
cash it in. This requirement can be divided into:
– Not Transferable: Whatever identity is presented at issuing phase shall not be transfered to
another identity.
– User Authentication: In addition to Not transferable, the identity of the user is the one who
it claims to be. The user who was issued the M-coupon must be the one who is cashing it at the
cashier. This requires the cashier to authenticate the user through some authentication method.
• No Multiple Cash-in: An attacker shall not be able to use the same M-coupon multiple times.
• Issuer’s ID anonymity: The identity of the issuer shall be secret between the issuer and the cashier.
Nevertheless, not all these requirements are promised by proposed protocols in the literature, and de-
pending on the M-coupon system some of these requirements can be optional. We consider user anonymity
in our proposed solution in Chapter 8.
4.4 Formal definition of NFC M-coupon security requirements
The following sections show what is written in CasperFDR to model different protocol’s requirements and
subsequently how they are captured underneath in terms of Running, Commit and Claim Secret events.
This is enabling for formal and precise descriptions of NFC mobile coupon requirements. These general
models can be applied to any protocol trying to meet the NFC M-coupon requirements. Of course, there
might be a slight modification according to the analysed protocol.
4.4.1 Confidentiality
We model confidentiality in CasperFDR as follows::
StrongSecret(Cashier,Secret, [Issuer])
This secrecy specification means the cashier claims that Secret is confidential with the Issuer. Secret
will be the critical part of the M-coupon. StrongSecret checks whether the intruder is able to break this
claim and knows the Secret during, or at the end, of the protocol. If Secret is leaked at the middle of
the protocol, the intruder may use it to generate new M-coupons. For example, the issuer generates an
M-coupon to the intruder who can use Secret, from the M-coupon, to generate a variety of M-coupons
either to oneself or different users.
41
User's Mobile Cashier
1
2
Issuer
Commit.C.I.M-coupon.UserID
Commit.C.I.M-coupon
Running.I.C.M-coupon.UserID
Running.I.C.M-coupon
                                     
                                                                       
     
3
4
Message 1
Message 2Running.U.C.credentials
Commit.C.I.ALL DATA
Running.I.C.ALL DATA
1
2
3
Commit.C.U.credentials 4
Claim_Secret.C.I.Secret 
Claim_Secret.C.I.IssuerID 
5
6
4
5
6
 User Authentication
1        Forgery Protection      
       2        Not Transferable
       3        Data Integrity      
       
        Issuer's ID anonymity      
       
       Confidentiality      
       
Message 2'
Commit.C.I.M-coupon 7
7       No Multiple Cash-in      
       
Figure 4.2: Capturing NFC M-coupon requirements in CasperFDR
Figure 4.2 (number 6) illustrates this specification. When the cashier performs the Claim Secret.C.I.Secret
event where C is the Cashier and I stands for Issuer, it can expect Secret to be confidential with the issuer.
If this is violated then the intruder can complete a run of the protocol with the cashier without taking the
issuer role, and in the process learn the secret value Secret. The value Secret is what the issuer and the
cashier believe to be confidential and is needed to redeem the M-coupon. If this holds, then the value Secret
is confidential from the issuer to the cashier at a complete, or incomplete, run of the protocol.
Here, the airline can make sure that wherever a customer has brought their M-coupon from, the se-
cret keys/values remain a secret throughout the protocol. This is a fundamental requirement that many
requirements are built on.
4.4.2 Forgery Protection (No Unauthorised Generation/No Manipulation)
We model forgery protection (No Unauthorised Generation and No Manipulation) in CasperFDR as follows:
NonInjectiveAgreement(Issuer, Cashier, [M-coupon])
First, one has to identify which part of the exchanged messages represents the M-coupon. This states
that if the cashier accepts the M-coupon, then the issuer must have issued it. NonInjective means that this
property is not concerned with repeats i.e. the cashier can accept many times what was issued once. This
property is violated if the cashier accepts an M-coupon that has not been issued by the issuer: either that
the M-coupon has been created by an attacker (i.e. Unauthorised Generation) or else that the M-coupon
generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipulation). Hence, if this property holds
then one has Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised Generation and No Manipulation.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (number 1). After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it
performs the Running.I.C.M-coupon event, which means the Issuer starts a run of the protocol, apparently,
with the Cashier, agreeing on M-coupon. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.M-coupon event
at the end of its part of the protocol, which means the Cashier has finished the protocol with the Issuer,
agreeing on the M-coupon. Each run of the issuer matches a run of the cashier but they can overlap since
one is not concerned with repeats. If this holds, then a genuine M-coupon has been generated by a genuine
issuer and accepted by the cashier.
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Now, the airline can make sure of the fact that the M-coupon is genuine. They can use the M-coupon
to increase and encourage people visiting their shops in the airport with promotions and discounts such as
free coffee. The airline is not concerned with who is using the M-coupon as long as it is genuinely issued.
4.4.3 Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable)
We model Not Transferable in CasperFDR as follows:
NonInjectiveAgreement(Issuer, Cashier, [M-coupon, User ID])
This specification is similar to forgery protection specification, but also with an agreement on a user’s
identity. The M-coupon must be attached to one user only, User ID. Both the issuer and the cashier agree
on the user to use the coupon as many times as he/she likes, as long as the coupon has been issued by a
genuine issuer and is being used by the intended user.
This is shown in Figure 4.2 (number 2). After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs
the Running.I.C.M-coupon.User ID event, which means the Issuer starts running the protocol, apparently,
with the Cashier, agreeing on M-coupon and User ID. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.M-
coupon.User ID event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means the Cashier has finished the
protocol with the Issuer and agreed on the M-coupon and User ID.
Observe that this property is stronger than forgery protection. If it holds then not only must the M-
coupon be genuine, as for forgery protection, but it must also have the same user. This is violated if the
cashier accepts a M-coupon that was issued for another user.
The airline can use the M-coupon as a frequent flyer coupon where one coupon can be used multiple
times for the same user. There is no need to authenticate the user every time as the cashier trusts the
issuing phase procedure. In addition, the airline can identify the original user who has passed the M-coupon
to a friend so that he or she can get credit for that.
4.4.4 Unauthorized Copying (User Authentication)
We model User Authentication in CasperFDR as follows:
Agreement(User, Cashier, [credential])
This specification is a stronger definition of Unauthorized Copying since it emphasises authenticating
the user who is carrying the M-coupon. The user who issued the M-coupon must be the one who is cashing
it at the cashier. This requires the cashier to authenticate the user through some authentication methods,
credential. Agreement is used because even though the M-coupon might be used many times, the user must
be authenticated each time.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (number 4). Normally, Message 2 would include some proof of user
authentication to the cashier. Before the user sends Message 2 of the protocol, it performs the Run-
ning.U.C.credential event, which means the user U starts a run of the protocol, apparently, with the
cashier, agreeing on credential. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.U.credential event at the end
of its part of the protocol, which means the cashier has finished the protocol with the user, agreeing on the
credential. If this holds, then the cashing user is the one who issued the M-coupon. This is violated if the
intruder was able to crack the authentication measure between the user and the cashier.
Here, the airline wants a stronger layer of user authentication. Maybe because it suspects the user or the
M-coupon has a very high value. The airline is happy to delay the protocol slightly as long as it has more
assurance about the user. The M-coupon in this case may include other sensitive procedure like payment.
4.4.5 Data Integrity
We can check the integrity of the whole data of the protocol by examining the following specification in
CasperFDR:
NonInjectiveAgreement(Issuer, Cashier, [ALL DATA])
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This will check the integrity of the protocol. Both the cashier and the issuer must agree on ALL DATA
in the protocol. Figure 4.2 (number 3) shows how it is captured. This is violated if any data in the protocol
was modified. If this holds, then the integrity of data between the issuer and the cashier is confirmed.
The airline is assured of the integrity of data included in the M-coupon. In addition, this is a higher
level of meeting Forgery Protection and Not transferable.
4.4.6 No Multiple Cash-in
We model No Multiple Cash-in in CasperFDR as follows:
Agreement(Issuer, Cashier, [M-coupon])
This specification states that every time the cashier accepts M-coupon, there must be a separate occasion
where the issuer must have issued them. Hence, the cashier cannot accept M-coupon more times than the
issuer sent them.
Figure 4.2 (numbers 1 and 7) illustrates a scenario where the cashier is engaging in the protocol twice,
with one issuer run. The first time, the cashier runs the protocol with the user’s mobile, and the second
time with Mallory who might be an intruder or the user. The second time, Commit should not occur if
there was not a separate Running. If this is violated, then there is a vulnerability in which the M-coupon
was cashed twice.
The airline wants to issue special targeted offers for some potential customers to access their VIP lounge,
but the access is only valid once.
4.4.7 Issuer’s ID anonymity
We model Issuer’s ID anonymity in CasperFDR as follows:
StrongSecret(Cashier, Issuer’s ID, [Issuer])
Throughout the protocol, the identity of the issuer must remain secret between the issuer and the cashier.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (number 5). The cashier claims the secrecy and anonymity of the issuer’s
identity at the end of the protocol. This is violated if the intruder, or the user, can eavesdrop the issuer’s
identity.
Here, the airline is assured with the anonymity of their issuers, which are distributed at different paces.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter illustrates a critical phase of the analysis and formal definition of the security requirements.
These formal definitions are now ready to be applied to any protocol trying to meet the NFC M-coupon
requirements, as shall be illustrated in the following chapters. Figure 4.3 illustrates the relationship between
the formal definitions of these requirements, presented in this section. Observe the NonInjectiveAgreement
specification includes three requirements and layers of authentications between the cashier and the issuer.
The weakest one is Forgery Protection, which after identifying data representing the M-coupon, a NonIn-
jectiveAgreement on the M-coupon between the issuer and the cashier is required. Not Transferable is a
stronger specification than Forgery Protection as it also requires an agreement on a user identity attached
to the M-coupon. The strongest NonInjectiveAgreement specification is Data Integrity, both the cashier and
the issuer must agree on the integrity of all data in the protocol. However, we are not concerned here with
repeats as it is checked by other requirements and may not be required at all in some systems.
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Figure 4.3: Hierarchy of authentication/secrecy properties
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Chapter 5
Modelling and Analysis of Dominikus et
al. Protocols
5.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the protocols proposed by Dominikus et al. [33], which are encryption-based NFC
M-coupon protocols. We formally analyse them using the CasperFDR approach, where an attack was found
against the advanced protocol. A solution was provided in order to address the vulnerability with the
required formal analysis.
The contribution made by this chapter toward the literature is the modelling of the simple and the
advanced protocols, with finding and addressing the vulnerability of the advanced protocol. More so, it is
important that the main vulnerabilities are highlighted despite the authors having designed the protocol
according to an ISO authentication standard [49]. In addition, two formally verified solutions were proposed
for the advanced protocol. In addition, an illustration of how to use the CasperFDR % notation for modelling
the behaviour of the user carrying the M-coupon without modification, while the intruder could modify it.
Finally, we apply the same implementation of the NFC threat model of restricting the intruder’s reaching
ability to engaging parties by allowing the participants (the user, the issuer and the cashier) to engage in
the protocol only once.
5.2 Protocols description
Dominikus and Aigner [33] propose two protocols: a simple, and an advanced M-coupon protocol. The
advanced protocol addresses five requirements:
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation:
– No Manipulation:
• Unauthorized Copying:
– Not Transferable
– User Authentication
• No Multiple Cash-in
Whereas, the simple protocol addresses the same requirements except for No Unauthorized Copying (Not
Transferable/ User Authentication) of the M-coupon.
Different approaches were used to address these requirements in the simple and advanced protocols.
Firstly, No Multiple Cash-in is addressed by establishing databases for all M-coupons used at all cashiers.
All new M-coupons can be checked online before cashing in, in order to prevent multiple cash-ins. Therefore,
there is no need for encryption countermeasures to meet this requirement. Secondly, No Unauthorized
Generation is addressed by establishing long term shared keys between cashiers and issuers (symmetric
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Table 5.1: Dominikus et al. protocol notation
U → I From User to Issuer.
ID(u) User ID.
ID(c) Cashier ID.
Offer Data about the Offer.
EK Shared key between Issuer and Cashier
EK[data] Encrypted data with EK key.
Nu User’s nonce (random number).
Ni Issuer’s nonce.
Nc Cashier1’s nonce.
Nc’ Cashier2’s nonce.
SigU Signature of user’s Mobile.
SigC Signature of Cashier.
SigU(data) Signature of the user on data.
BONUS Offer or promotion.
1. U → I : Nu
2. I → U : ID(i), Nu, Offer,EK [Offer, Nu]
3. U → C : ID(i), Nu, Offer, EK [Offer, Nu]
4. C → U : BONUS
Figure 5.1: The simple M-coupon protocol
authentication). Thirdly, No Manipulation is addressed by relying on the secrecy of the long term shared
keys between cashiers and issuers: any change in the M-coupon would be detected. Finally, both aspects of
No Unauthorized Copying are addressed by embedding a user’s signature inside the M-coupon.
The simple and the advanced protocols are shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. The notation in
the protocols description is given in Table 5.1.
5.2.1 The Simple M-coupon protocol
The aim of this protocol is to provide genuine M-coupons from genuine issuers. It allows users to copy
their M-coupons for their family and friends. However, the cashier has control over how many times the
M-coupon is cashed. There are four messages in this protocol, see Figure 5.1.
Issuing phase: after the user brings their mobile close to the issuer, the mobile sends a nonce (new
random number) Nu (message 1). Then, the Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user (message 2). The
M-coupon contains: the issuer identity, the user’s random number, the promised offer and an encrypted
part. The encrypted part also contains the offer and the user’s random number.
Cashing phase: the user can cash the M-coupon at any cashier who has a relationship with the issuer.
The user brings their mobile near the cashier and sends the M-coupon (message 3). The cashier checks three
things: firstly, the validity of cashing M-coupon through the nonce in accordance with the cashier’s policy.
Secondly, the encrypted part is equal to the unencrypted part. Thirdly, the fact that the encryption key
belongs to a genuine issuer. If all these conditions are satisfied, the bonus is granted to the user (message
4).
5.2.2 The Advanced M-coupon protocol
There are eight messages in this protocol, see Figure 5.2.
Issuing phase: In the advanced protocol two messages are added in this phase. After the user sends a
random number (message 1), the issuer sends a random number as well (message 2), and asks the user to
sign it (message 3). The issuer would not be able to verify the signature, but the signature will be included
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1. U → I : Nu
2. I → U : Ni
3. U → I : ID(u), SigU( Ni )
4. I → U : ID(i), Nu, Offer, EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni ), Offer, Nu]
5. U → C : ID(i), Nu, Offer, EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni ), Offer, Nu]
6. C → U : Nc
7. U → C : ID(u), SigU( Nc )
8. C → U : BONUS
Figure 5.2: The advanced M-coupon protocol
inside the encrypted part of the M-coupon (message 4). Later, the cashier will verify the signature to make
sure no one can cash the M-coupon except the user who has signed it at the issuing phase.
Cashing phase: A further two messages are added in this phase. The cashier verifies the user’s signature
included inside the M-coupon (message 5), which was signed at the issuing phase. Then, the user is authen-
ticated again by the cashier in order to ensure that this is the same user. So, the cashier sends a random
number (message 6). Then the user signs it (message 7) and sends it back to the cashier. If both signatures
(messages 5 and 7) are confirmed, the bonus is granted to the user (message 8).
5.3 Modelling
5.3.1 The protocol: messages and system
In the simple protocol, the M-coupon is identified with Offer and the encrypted Nonces (Nu). Figure 5.3
shows the CasperFDR script of the simple protocol. In the #Protocol description messages 3 and 4, the
M-coupon is represented as {offer, nu}{sh}% coupon. The User will not be able to verify the M-coupon
because of the secret key, and will just pass it to the cashier. This scenario reflects the relationship between
the user and the M-coupon in reality. In #System, all the participants (the user, the issuer and the cashier)
are engaging in the protocol only once, where the intruder does not have unlimited access to the parties.
In the advanced protocol, the M-coupon is identified with Offer and the encrypted Nonces (Nu and Ni).
Figure 5.4 shows the CasperFDR script for the advanced protocol.In the #Protocol description, The
user’s signature is not verified by the issuer, message 3, and is encapsulated inside the M-coupon in message
4 and 5. The M-coupon is represented as {U,ni, sigu%{ni}{sKUser},offer, nu}{sh} % coupon, which
includes the user’s signature and the user passes it to the cashier without any verification. All previous
scenarios reflect the protocol in reality. All parties are engaged in the protocol only once as it is illustrated
in #System.
5.3.2 The protocol’s requirements
Forgery Protection
The M-coupon is identified with Offer and the encrypted Nonces Nu in the simple protocol, and Nu and Ni
in the advanced protocol. In the #Specification in Figure 5.3, we model forgery protection at the simple
protocol as follows:
Forgery Protection-simple: NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[Offer,Nu])
And in the #Specification at Figure 5.4, we model forgery protection at the advanced protocol as follows:
Forgery Protection-advanced : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[Offer,Ni,Nu])
As M-coupon repeats are not considered in this case, we use the NonInjective specification. This states
that if a cashier accepts the simple (Offer,Nu) or the advanced (Offer,Ni,Nu), then the issuer must have
issued them. The cashier can accept many times what was issued only once. This is violated if the cashier
accepts (Offer/Ni/Nu) that have not been issued by the issuer. This implies either that (Offer/Ni/Nu)
have been created by an attacker (i.e. No Unauthorised Generation) or else that an M-coupon generated by
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
nu : Nonce
bonus : Bonuses
offer : Offers
sh : SharedKey
InverseKeys = (sh, sh)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U, nu)
RESPONDER1(I,C,offer,sh)
RESPONDER2(C,I,offer,bonus,sh)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I
1. U -> I : nu
2. I -> U : I, nu, offer, {offer, nu} {sh} % coupon
3. U -> C : I, nu, offer, coupon % {offer, nu} {sh}
4. C -> U : bonus
#Specification
-- No manipulation
-- No Unauthorized Generation
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[offer,nu])
-- No attack
#Actual variables
User,Mallory : Users
Issuer : Issuers
Cashier : Cashiers
Nu, Nm : Nonce
Bonus : Bonuses
Offer : Offers
SH : SharedKey
InverseKeys = (SH, SH)
#System
INITIATOR(User,Nu)
RESPONDER1(Issuer,Cashier, Offer,SH)
RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer,Offer, Bonus,SH)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {User, Cashier, Issuer, Mallory, Nm}
Figure 5.3: CasperFDR modelling of the simple protocol
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
nu,ni,nc : Nonce
bonus : Bonuses
offer : Offers
sh : SharedKey
pKUser : PublicKeyUser
sKUser : SecretKeyUser
InverseKeys = (sh, sh) , (pKUser,sKUser)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U, nu,pKUser,sKUser)
RESPONDER1(I,C,offer,sh,ni)
RESPONDER2(C,I,offer,bonus,sh,pKUser,nc)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I,C
1. U -> I : nu
2. I -> U : ni
3. U -> I : U, {ni}{sKUser} % sigu
4. I -> U : I, nu, offer, {U, ni,sigu % {ni}{sKUser},offer, nu} {sh} % coupon
5. U -> C : I, nu, offer, coupon % {U, ni,sigu % {ni}{sKUser},offer, nu} {sh}
6. C -> U : nc
7. U -> C : U,{nc}{sKUser}
8. C -> U : bonus
#Specification
-- No manipulation
-- No Unauthorized Generation
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[offer,nu,ni])
-- No attack
-- Not transfarable
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[offer,nu,ni,U])
-- User Authentication
Agreement(U,C,[ni,U])
-- no attack
Agreement(U,C,[nc,U])
-- no attack
Agreement(U,C,[nu,U])
-- attack found
#Actual variables
User,Mallory : Users
Issuer : Issuers
Cashier: Cashiers
Nu,Ni,Nc, Nm : Nonce
Bonus : Bonuses
Offer : Offers
SH : SharedKey
PKUser , PKMallory : PublicKeyUser
SKUser, SKMallory : SecretKeyUser
InverseKeys = (SH, SH), (PKUser,SKUser),(PKMallory,SKMallory)
#System
INITIATOR(User,Nu,PKUser,SKUser)
RESPONDER1(Issuer,Cashier, Offer,SH,Ni)
RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer,Offer, Bonus,SH,PKUser,Nc)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {User, Cashier, Issuer, Mallory, Nm,PKMallory,SKMallory }
Figure 5.4: CasperFDR modelling of the advanced protocol
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(b) The advanced protocol properties
Figure 5.5: Capturing the Dominikus et al. protocols properties
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the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipulation). Hence, if this property holds then one has
Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised Generation and No Manipulation.
The first specification for the simple protocol is illustrated within Figure 5.5a from a CSP view. After
the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the Running.I.C.Offer.Nu event, which means
issuer I starts a running of the protocol, apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on Offer and Nu. Later, the
cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.Offer.Nu event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means the
cashier C has finished the protocol with the issuer I, agreeing on the Offer and Nu.
The second specification for the advanced protocol is illustrated within Figure 5.5b from a CSP view.
After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the Running.I.C.Offer.Ni.Nu event, which
means issuer I starts a run of the protocol, apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on Offer, Ni and Nu. Later,
the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.Offer.Ni.Nu event at the end of its part of the protocol, which
means that cashier C has finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on the Offer, Ni and Nu.
Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable)
This specification is only required by the advanced protocol. It is an agreement between the issuer and the
cashier on a M-coupon with a specific user. This property is stronger than forgery protection. If it holds,
not only must the M-coupon be genuine, as for forgery protection, but it must also have the same user.
As we have identified the M-coupon with Offer, Ni and Nu in the advanced protocol, Not Transferable is
modelled in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at Figure 5.4):
Not Transferable-advanced : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[Offer,Ni,Nu,U])
The M-coupon (Offer,Ni,Nu) must be attached to the presented identity U. Both the issuer and the cashier
agree on a user U to use the coupon as many times as they like. If this is violated, then either the coupon
has not been issued by a genuine issuer or the issuing identity has changed during the protocol.
This is shown from the CSP perspective in Figure 5.5b. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol,
it performs the Running.I.C.Offer.Ni.Nu.ID(u) event, which means issuer I starts a running of the protocol,
apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on the coupon, Offer, Ni and Nu, and an identity ID(u). Later, the
cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.Offer.Ni.Nu.ID(u) event at the end of its part of the protocol, which
means cashier C has finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on Offer, Ni, Nu and ID(u).
Unauthorized Copying (User Authentication)
This is a stronger specification of Unauthorized Copying. It is an authentication between the user and the
cashier that the user is who he/she claims to be. The user is authenticated through the signed nonces
(Ni and Nc) with his/her attached nonce Nu. User Authentication is modelled in CasperFDR as follows
(#Specification at Figure 5.4):
User Authentication-advanced : Agreement(U,C,[Ni,Nu,Nc,U])
The user is authenticated by (Ni,U ) signed at the issuing phase, and (Nc,U ) signed at the cashing phase,
with the user nonce Nu which is attached to the coupon. If this is violated, then either there is a weakness
at signature procedures for Ni and Nc, or the attacker was able to inject his or her own nonce instead of
the user’s nonce Nu and the cashier accepted it.
This is illustrated in 5.5b. Just before message 7, the user performs the Running.U.C.Ni.Nu.Nc.ID(u)
event, which means user U declares he/she is running the protocol, apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on
Ni, Nu, Nc and ID(u). Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.U.Offer.Ni.Nu.Nc.ID(u) event at the
end of its part of the protocol, which means cashier C has finished the protocol with user ID(u), agreeing
on Ni and Nu, Nc and ID(u). Agreement will make sure that every Running event by the user corresponds
to one Commit by the cashier, which is required in such an authentication.
5.3.3 Intruder knowledge
The analysis also requires one to define the initial knowledge of the intruder. The intruder knows the
following: the identities of himself or herself, the user, the issuer and the cashier, and a nonce Nm with, in
the advanced protocol, his or her own private and public key.
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Attacker
ID(i), Nm, Offer, 
EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni ), Offer, Nm]M-coupon =
M-coupon
Figure 5.6: The advanced protocol attack trace
5.3.4 Assumptions
We do not model the Multiple cash-in requirement because it is not managed by the protocol itself but by
a database at the cashier, which knows all M-coupons used so far. It is an assumption built into this model
that the cashiers have such a database and use it in a secure manner. The concern is with the attacks on
the protocol itself, instead of attacks on the use of the database per se.
5.4 Analysis
With respect to Forgery Protection and Not Transferable, FDR2 did not find any attacks on either
the simple or the advanced M-coupon protocols.
However, an attack was found when we examined the protocol with respect to User Authentication
in the advanced protocol. For a better understanding of the attack, and efficiency, we can divide the User
authentication specification Agreement(U,C,[Ni,Nc,Nu,U]) into:
Agreement(U,C,[Ni,U])
Agreement(U,C,[Nc,U])
Agreement(U,C,[Nu,U])
This enable one to figure out where the flaw is precisely. The outcome result is that Agreement(U,C,[Nu,U])
is the violated specification. Here, all agents behave honestly and thus play their role correctly.
Figure 5.6 is the attack trace provided by CasperFDR, shown in a sequence diagram form. The intruder
starts the protocol with the issuer by sending his or her own nonce Nm pretending to be the user. As the
issuer can not verify this, it will send its nonce Ni. In the next step, the user starts the protocol with an
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Table 5.2: Encryption based protocols against intended/addressed/failed requirements
The simple The advanced
Confidentiality
Data Integrity
No Unauthorized Generation
√ √
No Manipulation
√ √
No Multiple Cash in
Not Transferable
√
User Authentication x
Issuer’s ID anonymity
issuer (the intruder) by exchanging nonces, as the intruder already has the real issuer nonce Ni he/she will
ask the user to sign it. Then, because of the fact that the user can not verify the M-coupon, the intruder
sends Garbage. The intruder sends the signed nonce Ni by the user to the issuer to get the M-coupon. The
issuer generates the M-coupon with the intruder’s nonce Nm that the intruder sends to the cashier directly.
The cashier accepts the M-coupon even though the nonce is different from what the user thinks. After this,
the intruder can just pass messages between the user and the cashier since the user thinks he or she runs the
protocol with a cashier, and the cashier thinks it runs the protocol with the user. At the end, the intruder
gets the BONUS before the user.
Even if the cashier and the user agree on the signed nonces by the user (Ni/Nc), the user thinks they have
completed the protocol with the cashier using their own nonce Nu but the cashier believes the user’s nonce
is Nm. However, Nm is the nonce generated by the intruder with which he/she succeeds in circumventing
the authentication verification by mirroring the legitimacy of a M-coupon
This would result in two undesirable consequences. Firstly, when the intruder uses the coupon, they
are able to acquire an M-coupon signed by the original customer and subsequently cash it. This makes the
cashier believes they have completed a run of the protocol with the user. Later, when the real user comes to
cash his or her M-coupon the cashier will not accept it because either the M-coupon is invalid or, in the case
of a genuine M-coupon, they think the user is using the M-coupon twice. Secondly, when the user cashes
the coupon with a different nonce from the one generated, the greatest danger is if the nonce is used as an
evidence. For example, the user has to prove they have used 50 coupons to get something or pay them back
a deposit, in this case some of the nonces would be different from the once that the cashier had.
On the other hand, Dominikus and Aigner have followed the ISO authentication standard [49] when
they developed their protocol, which insists on including the identity of the verifier (Cashier) in order to
address possible attacks. Nevertheless, the standard allows the omission of the identity of the verifier if the
protocol is in a single direction, i.e. a client and server without server authentication, where the client is
only ever authenticated to one server [49]. The NFC M-coupon protocol is not an example of such a system,
as it is very likely to have many cashiers in the scheme. We recommend that the suggestion put forward by
the standard, of omitting the identity of the verifier, should not be followed in this M-coupon system. An
attack may occur if the identity of the verifier were to be omitted.
5.5 Suggested solution
In order to address the vulnerability found at the advanced protocol, the following changes should take place:
1. U → I : Nu
2. I → U : Ni
3. U → I : ID(u), SigU( Ni,Nu )
4. I → U : ID(i), Nu, Offer, EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni,Nu ), Offer, Nu]
5. U → C : ID(i), Nu, Offer, EK [ID(u), Ni, SigU( Ni,Nu ), Offer, Nu]
6. C → U : Nc
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Issuer User's Mobile Cashier
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Bonus,
 SigC (Nc,Nu2,ID(u),Bonus )
Figure 5.7: The modified advanced protocol
7. U → C : ID(u), SigU( ID(u), ID(c), Nc )
8. C → U : BONUS
At message 3, 4 and 5, the user signs both nonces (Ni,Nu). In addition, at message 7 the user includes
their identity ID(u) and the cashier’s identity ID(c) to the signature.
A more robust solution, with fewer messages, is illustrated in Figure 5.7. From the protocol’s perspec-
tive, a user should include the identity of the verifier in any signature. The best way to do this is by a
mutual authentication between the user’s mobile and the cashier, which we designed according to the ISO
authentication standard [49]. After the issuer sends a nonce to the user’s mobile (message 1), the user’s
mobile signs the issuer’s nonce and combines it with their identity and a nonce (message 2) in clear. Then,
the issuer sends the M-coupon to the user (message 3). In the cashing phase, a mutual authentication is
done between the user’s mobile and the cashier. The cashier sends their identity and a nonce (message 4).
At message 5, the user sends a signature of the following: the M-coupon, the cashier’s nonce, a new nonce
generated by the user’s mobile and the cashier’s identity. Plus, message 5 is combined with the user’s mobile
identity, the new nonce and the M-coupon. At this stage, the user’s mobile is authenticated to the cashier.
The cashier can stop the protocol at this stage in case of an attack. Finally, the cashier sends the bonus
and authenticates itself to the user by signing its nonce with the user’s nonce, the user’s identity, and the
bonus. At this stage, the user makes sure the bonus came from the cashier.
There are two ways in which the user’s mobile can communicate with a Trusted Third Party; online or
oﬄine. If the NFC M-coupon scheme is used as part of a mobile wallet, the need for online access would
be easy since the online access would be already available to other applications. If the NFC M-coupon is
used as a separate application, oﬄine authentication between the user and the cashier might be performed
by exchanging certificates generated by a Trusted Third Party.
We formally analysed the security of this solution with CasperFDR, and found no attacks. At the cashing
phase, we were able to examine systems with up to two different users and two different cashiers.
55
5.6 Conclusion
We formally analysed the security of the NFC mobile coupon protocols proposed by Dominikus and Aigner
[33], by using CasperFDR. The analysis identified an attack against the advanced protocol: that an intruder
could cash an M-coupon even if they are not allowed to do so. This is because the M-coupon user’s mobile
generates signatures without including the identity of the cashier. We have suggested a solution, and
performed the same formal analysis on the resulting protocol, and with it identified the attack that was no
longer present.
These protocols include a heavy encryption which may not be a perfect choice for NFC. The next chapter
analyses a Hash-based protocol that seeks to overcome this issue.
56
Chapter 6
Modelling and Analysis of Hsiang et al.
(Hash-Based) NFC M-coupon Protocol
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider a hashed-based NFC M-coupon protocol proposed by Hsiang et al. [48]. Theo-
retically, the hashed-based protocol is faster than the encryption-based protocols since it uses simple hash
functions, even if this could be arguable in today’s mobile phones. We formally analyse the hash based NFC
M-coupon protocol using CasperFDR.
The contribution made by this chapter toward the literature is that, in addition to the protocol modelling,
we model an assumption made by the protocol’s designers that the client’s ID is bound to the client’s mobile
device, and therefore the client is authenticated. Any found attack is examined under this assumption to
check whether the attack is still applicable. We also discovered a few possible attacks which break the
requirements of the protocol. Thus, a number of solutions are proposed to address these attacks based on
two different threat models. Moreover, a new requirement, No Multiple Cash-in, is modelled in this chapter.
6.2 Protocol Description
The M-coupon protocol of [48] uses simple hash functions, a computationally light cryptographic method,
a particularly suitable choice with standard RFID/NFC tags. Figure 6.1 highlights the messages of the
protocols, and Table 6.1 shows the notation used in the protocol. The protocol intends to meet six security
requirements (including the sub-requirements), as stated by the protocol designer in [48]:
• Confidentiality
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Unauthorized Copying(Not Transferable)
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
There are four messages in this protocol, see Figure 6.1. Initially, cashier C and issuer I share a secret
value, X, and an offer. The cashier stores a table consisting of hashes of all issuers identities, h[ID(i)].
At the issuing phase, the user’s mobile U sends their identity to the issuer (message 1). Then, the issuer
produces a coupon, M (message 2), consisting of three parts: ID(u), V and C.
V = ID(u)⊕ h[ID(i)]
C = h[h[ID(i)]⊕X ⊕Offer]
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Table 6.1: Hashed-based Protocol notation
ID(i) Issuer ID
ID(u) User ID
Offer Data about the Offer
X A secret value shared between the issuer and the cashier
⊕ Exclusive or (XOR)
h[..] Hash function
1. U → I : ID(u)
2. I → U : M = ID(u) , V , C
3. U → C : M = ID(u) , V , C
4. C → U : BONUS
Figure 6.1: The Hsiang et al. (hash-based) M-coupon protocol
At the cashing phase, the user’s mobile sends the M-coupon to the cashier (message 3). Then, the cashier
obtains h[ID(i)] by computing ID(u)⊕ V . The cashier can look up ID(i) from the hash, and then find X
and Offer. When the cashier has ID(u) and Offer, it can decide if the M-coupon has been used before by
the user, and accept or reject it accordingly. Then, the cashier will check the validity of the M-coupon by
computing h[h[ID(i)]⊕X ⊕Offer] and confirm it matches C. The cashier stores ID(u) to prevent re-use
of the coupon and sends the Bonus to the user.
The intention is that the Confidentiality and Data Integrity requirements are ensured by use of the secret
value X. By including the identity of the user’s mobile and offer, Multiple Cash-in and Not Transferable
can be managed. Forgery Protection is addressed by the secret value X which is known only to the cashier
and issuer.
6.3 Modelling
6.3.1 The protocol: messages and system
The M-coupon is identified with X and Offer. Figure 6.2 shows the CasperFDR script of the Hsiang et
al. (hash-based) protocol. In the #Protocol description, the M-coupon is h( h(I)(+)offer(+) x )%w
which the user passes to the cashier without any verification. The part U(+)h(I)%l is also passed to the
cashier by the user even if the user is able to create the same message by themselves, as it is required by
the protocol.
In #System all participants engage in the protocol once except in the occasion where the cashier is
engaging twice to examine No Multiple Cash-in property.
6.3.2 The protocol’s requirements
In the following sections, we highlight what has to be written in CasperFDR to model the protocol’s
requirements as well as how it is captured in terms of Running, Commit and Claim Secret events. This
enables one to have a formal and precise description of the NFC M-coupon requirements.
Confidentiality
We model confidentiality in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at Figure 6.2) :
Confidentiality- Hashed Based : StrongSecret(C, X,Offer, [I])
This secrecy specification suggests that cashier C claims that X and Offer are confidential between
the cashier C and issuer I. StrongSecret checks whether the intruder is able to break the claims without
completing the protocol. Figure 6.3 illustrates the specification, secrecy of X and Offer.
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
h : HashFunction
offer : Offers
bonus : Bonuses
x : Secret
InverseKeys = (x,x)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U)
RESPONDER1(I, C, x,offer)
RESPONDER2(C, I, bonus, x,offer)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I,C
1. U -> I : U
2. I -> U : U, U(+)h(I)%l, h(h(I) (+) offer (+) x)%w
3. U -> C : U, l% U(+)h(I), w% h(h(I) (+) offer (+) x)
4. C -> U : bonus
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
#Specification
-- No Eavesdropping, (i.e. Confidntiality)
StrongSecret(C, x , [I])
StrongSecret(C, offer , [I])
StrongSecret(C, I , [I])
-- No attack
-- Forgery Protection:
-- No Unauthorised Generation,
-- No Manipulation.
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer])
-- (NO ATTACK)
-- Not transfarable
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,U])
-- Attack found
-- No Data Modification.
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,U,I])
-- attack found
-- No Multiple Cash-in
--Agreement(I,C,[x,offer])
-- (ATTACK FOUND)
#Actual variables
User, Mallory :Users
Issuer: Issuers
Cashier: Cashiers
Bonus : Bonuses
Offer : Offers
X: Secret
InverseKeys = (X,X)
#System
INITIATOR(User)
RESPONDER1(Issuer, Cashier,X, Offer)
RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer, Bonus,X, Offer)
-- No Multiple Cash-in
--RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer, Bonus,X, Offer)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {User,Cashier,Mallory}
Figure 6.2: CasperFDR modelling of the Hsiang et al. (hash-based) protocol
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Figure 6.3: Capturing Hsiang et al. (hash-based) NFC M-coupon requirements
When cashier C performs the Claim Secret.C.I.X.Offer event, it can expect X and Offer to be a secret
with issuer I who shares the secret key X, and knows the Offer. If this is violated, then the intruder can
complete a run of the protocol with the cashier without taking the issuer’s role, and learn the secret key X
or Offer.
Forgery Protection
Forgery protection is modelled in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at Figure 6.2):
Forgery Protection- Hashed Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer])
We examine the parts of the M-coupon that are believed, by the cashier and the issuer, to be unforgeable
in all M-coupons, X and Offer. We are not concerned with the user’s identity, as the property is not tied to a
user. This states that if a cashier accepts X and Offer, then the issuer must have issued them. NonInjective
means that it is not concerned with repeats, i.e. the cashier can accept many times what was issued once.
This is violated if the cashier accepts X and Offer that have not been issued by the issuer. This implies either
that X and Offer have been created by an attacker (i.e. Unauthorised Generation) or that an M-coupon
generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipulation ). Hence, if this property holds
then one has Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised Generation and No Manipulation.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.3. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the
Running.I.C.X.Offer event, which means issuer I starts a running of the protocol, apparently, with cashier
C, agreeing on X and offer. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.X.Offer event at the end of its
part of the protocol, which means that cashier C has finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on the X
and Offer.
Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable)
Not Transferable is modelled in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at Figure 6.2):
Not Transferable- Hashed Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(u)])
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This specification is similar to the forgery protection specification, but has an added agreement on a user
identity. The coupon, [X, Offer ], must be attached to one user only ID(u). Both the issuer and the cashier
agree on the user to use the coupon as many times as they like, as long as the coupon has been issued by
a genuine issuer, and is being used by the intended user. An example for such a coupon is a frequent flyer
coupon.
This is shown in Figure 6.3. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the Run-
ning.I.C.X.Offer.ID(u) event, which means issuer I starts a run of the protocol, apparently, with cashier C,
agreeing on X, Offer and ID(u). Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(u) event at the
end of its part of the protocol, which means cashier C has finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on
the X, Offer and ID(u).
Observe that this property is stronger than forgery protection. If it holds, not only must the M-coupon
be genuine, as for forgery protection, but it must also have the same user.
Data Integrity
Data Integrity is modelled in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at Figure 6.2):
Data Integrity- Hashed Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(u),ID(i)])
This will check the integrity of the protocol. Both the cashier and the issuer must agree on all the
information in the protocol. This is shown in Figure 6.3, the Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(u).ID(i) event and
the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(u).ID(i).
No Multiple Cash-in
No Multiple Cash-in is modelled in CasperFDR (#Specification at Figure 6.2):
No Multiple Cash-in- Hashed Based : Agreement(I,C,[X,Offer])
This specification states that every time the cashier accepts X and Offer, there must be a separate
occasion where the issuer must have issued them. Hence, cashier cannot accept X and Offer more times
than an issuer has sent them.
Figure 6.3 illustrates a scenario where the cashier is engaging in the protocol twice, with one issuer run.
The first time the cashier runs the protocol with the user’s mobile, and the second time with Mallory who
might be an intruder or the user himself. The second Commit should not occur if there was not a separate
Running.
6.3.3 Intruder knowledge
The analysis also requires a definition of the initial knowledge of the intruder. The intruder knows the
following: its own identity ID(m), the user identity ID(u) and the cashier ID(c), and the hash function h.
The intruder does not know the offer.
6.3.4 Assumptions
There is an assumption made by the protocol’s designers that the client’s ID is bound to the client’s mobile
device, and therefore the client is authenticated at issuing and cashing phases. Therefore, we analyse this
protocol under two different assumptions: with no assumption made (The Dolev-Yao model) and where the
user’s ID is bound to the mobile. The main goal for analysing the protocol under this assumption is that if
an attack is discovered under the Dolev-Yao model, then we should examine if the attack still applies under
the assumption made.
On the other hand, it is quite tricky to think of a scenario where the user is authenticated by just sending
their identity even if this identity is bounded to their mobile. The intruder can eavesdrop a message sent
by the user including the user identity, and then can claim to be the user. The only case this assumption
can be true is if the user authentication is carried out in the issuing phase by another independent trusted
method, and the cashier trusts this process. Therefore, the way we model this is by concealing the message
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Table 6.2: Hash based protocol and provided solutions against intended/addressed/failed requirements
Hsiang et al. (hash-based) Enhanced Hash-based
Confidentiality
√ √
Forgery Protection
√ √
Data Integrity x
√
No Multiple Cash in x
√
Not Transferable x
√
User Authentication
that includes the user’s identity from the intruder. This is the strongest way to model it, where if there
is an attack, then the attack should exist in a weaker assumption. The user’s identity is hidden from the
intruder’s knowledge, and message 1 is concealed from the intruder i.e. the intruder can not eavesdrop, fake,
re-ascribe or redirect message 1. We model this in CasperFDR as follows (as explained in Section 3.8):
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
6.4 Analysis
As illustrated in Table 6.2, the outcome of the analysis shows no attack in Confidentiality and Forgery
Protection.
However, attacks were found for the Not Transferable, Data Integrity and No Multiple Cash-in properties.
The main vulnerability is a simple logical attack against the hashes of the M-coupon. The identity of the
user attached to the M-coupon can be easily extracted and changed to any identity. If one considers the
M-coupon, the identity ID(u) is not attached correctly to the M-coupon. Anyone is able to use the first
two parts, ID(u) and V to get h[ID(i)]:
h[ID(i)] = ID(u)⊕ V
By obtaining h[ID(i)], the intruder is able to attach any identity, such as ID(intruder) without changing
the third part C, and thus produce a new coupon M ′:
V ′ = ID(intruder)⊕ h[ID(i)]
M ′ = ID(intruder) , V ′ , C
Even though this analysis was under the Dolev-Yao threat model, the specification is still broken under
the assumption of the independent user authentication process. The attacker still could change the user
identity in an eavesdropped M-coupon, from message 2 (Figure 6.1), to their own identity and cash it in
with the cashier. This is the strongest model for authenticating the user and, therefore, there should be an
attack if a weaker assumption is made.
6.5 Suggested solution
In order to address the broken properties (Not Transferable, Data Integrity and No Multiple Cash-in) in
the original Hsiang et al. (hash-based) protocol, the identity of the user must be attached correctly to the
coupon. The change required is a modelling of the C part to include ID(u) within the hash:
C = h[h[ID(i)], X,Offer, ID(u)]
This modification was verified by CasperFDR and no attack was found in both threat models, the Dolev-Yao
and user’s authentication assumption.
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6.6 Conclusion
We used formal methods, CasperFDR, to examine a hash based M-coupon protocol and check whether it
meets its requirements. The outcome of the analysis shows a simple logical attack in the hashes combination
of the M-coupon, which damages a number of the protocol’s requirements. Solutions were provided based
on two assumptions: when the issuing phase is trusted where the intruder is more restricted; and where the
intruder has the power to claim any identity. An enhanced version of this protocol is analysed in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 7
Modelling and Analysis of Hsiang et al.
(QR-Based) NFC M-coupon Protocol
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses a quadratic residue theorem (QR) based NFC M-coupon protocol [47]. The Hsiang et
al. (QR-based) protocol is an enhanced version of the Hsiang et al. (hash-based) protocol discussed in the
previous chapter with almost the same authors [47].
The chapter’s contribution is a modelling of the protocol in conjunction with the quadratic residue
theorem. We propose two ways of abstracting QR in the model with the pros and cons of both methods.
Furthermore, we highlight how to solve a problem with CasperFDR that it is not possible to model a
complex procedures of placing X and Offer in the issuer’s memory at the manufacture stage. Moreover, in
this protocol a new M-coupon requirement is modelled, Issuer’s ID anonymity.
7.2 Protocol description
The protocol intends to meet all eight security requirements, as stated by the protocol designer in [47]:
• Confidentiality
• Issuer’s ID anonymity
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Unauthorized Copying
– Not Transferable
– User Authentication
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
The Hsiang et al. (QR-based) protocol utilises quadratic residue [85, 22] to securely hide some values.
The main idea of QR is that assuming one has n = p ∗ q where p and q are two large primes, and given
x2 = a mod n, it is computationally infeasible to find x. The only parties who can extract x are those who
know p and q.
Figure 7.1 shows the messages of the protocols, and Table 7.1 has the notation used. The three main
participants are: the issuer I, the user U and the cashier C.
Before the beginning of the protocol, there are some initial steps. The user downloads a coupon appli-
cation where the cashier and the user share a secret password PIN and an identity is assigned to the user
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User's Mobile Cashier
1
2
Issuer
ID(u)
M = {Y, R, h(y), h(r), Vm}
BONUS
ID(u), E, P and M
Invents: RC
Computes:  E = RC ⊕ PIN 
                      P = hPIN[ ID(u), RC ]    3
4
PIN, ID(u)
Vi = hX[ID(i) offer]
ID(i)
h[ID(i)]
Invents: r
Computes:  y = h[ID(i)] ⊕ r ⊕ ID(u) 
                      Y = y2 mod n 
                      R = r2 mod n
                      Vm = hvi[r, y]
Invents: p, q
Computes: N = p.qN
Figure 7.1: Quadratic Residue-based M-coupon protocol
ID(u). In addition, the cashier computes V i = hX [ID(i), offer] and then writes ID(i), h[ID(i)] and V i
into issuer’s memory where ID(i), X and offer remain secret through the protocol. The cashier computes
n = p ∗ q as well provide the issuer with n.
There are four messages in this protocol:
1. U → I : ID(u)
2. I → U : M = Y, R, h(y), h(r), Vm
3. U → C : ID(u), E, P and M
4. C → U : BONUS
Message 1: the user sends their identity ID(u) to the issuer. The issuer replies in message 2 with the
M-coupon M = Y,R, h(y), h(r), V m:
y = h[ID(i)]⊕ r ⊕ ID(u)
Y = y2 mod n
R = r2 mod n
V m = hvi[r, y]
The value y contains a hash of the following: an Xor of the identity of the issuer ID(i), issuer’s random
number r and the identity of the user ID(u). The values y and r are secret between the issuer and the
65
Table 7.1: Hsiang et al. (QR-based) Protocol notation
ID(i) Issuer ID
ID(u) User ID. Note: in the paper [47] named ID(c)
Offer Data about the Offer
X A secret key shared between the issuer and the cashier
PIN A secret password shared between the user and the cashier
⊕ Exclusive or (XOR)
r Issuer’s random number
RC User’s random number
h[..] Hash function
hs[..] Keyed hash function with secret s
cashier by using QR, and can be computed from Y and R. The cashier can compute y and r from p and q.
Vm is for the integrity of y and r, where Vm contains a keyed hash of y and r with vi as a key.
Message 3, the user’s mobile sends the M-coupon M with the authentication credential: ID(u), E and
P :
E = RC ⊕ PIN
P = hPIN [ID(u), RC]
In E, a random number RC is used to make a random password PIN. Since the cashier knows the PIN
from the identity of the user ID(u), it can check the randomness of the password (knowing RC ). In order to
link the password PIN to the user identity ID(u), P is a keyed hash of ID(u) and RC, with PIN as a key.
The cashier verifies the authenticity of the user’s credentials, and the validation of the M-coupon. If
both are accepted and share the same user’s identity, then the cashier sends BONUS to the user, message
4.
7.3 Modelling
7.3.1 The protocol: messages and system
This section shows the protocol modelling, as given in Figure 7.2 (#Protocol description). The M-coupon
is identified with X, Offer and ID(i).
In addition to the general modelling of the protocol, we explain how to solve two technical problems
with CasperFDR:
• First, we could not directly model an initial step of placing X and Offer into the issuer’s memory at
the manufacturing stage. It is a complex procedure for CasperFDR to place X and Offer into the
issuer’s memory during the manufacturing stage. The ideal modelling would be to pass V i to the
issuer by the % mechanism, which is a CasperFDR way to handle encrypted messages e.g. because the
entity does not have the key. However, CasperFDR could not handle such a complex requirement. We
solve this by making the issuer know X and Offer. The model shows that the issuer knows the value
of X and Offer, whereas in reality the issuer does not know it explicitly but rather implicitly from
the value V i (where V i = hX [ID(i), offer]) which is placed by the cashier inside the issuer’s memory
during the manufacturing stage. Even though this model is implicitly true, the issuer can not tell what
X and Offer are exactly. Nevertheless, this modelling is more vulnerable than the original protocol.
Therefore, if this model holds, then it guarantees more security. The reason is that this model assumes
an explicit knowledge of X, Offer by the issuer, whereas in the original protocol the issuer knows them
implicitly. If there was no attack on the explicit knowledge of X, Offer by the issuer, then there should
be no attack as well with the implicit knowledge i.e. the chances of the intruder to know X and Offer
with a knowledge of two parties (cashier and issuer) is more than a knowledge of one party (cashier).
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
h : HashFunction
offer : Offers
bonus : Bonuses
QR :Issuers x Cashiers -> SharedKey
x : Secret
pin : Password
r, rc: Random
InverseKeys = (QR,QR)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U,C,rc,pin)
RESPONDER1(I, C, r,x,offer) knows QR(I,C)
RESPONDER2(C, I,U, bonus, x,offer,pin) knows QR(I,C)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I
1. U -> I : U
2QR. I -> U : {h(I)(+)r(+)U}{QR(I,C)}%yQR , {r}{QR(I,C)} %rQR
2M. I -> U : h(h(I)(+)r(+)U) %hy, h(r)%hr, h( h(x,I,offer),r, h(I)(+)r(+)U)%vm
3AUTH. U -> C : U, rc(+)pin, h(pin,U,rc)
3QR. U -> C : yQR% {h(I)(+)r(+)U}{QR(I,C)}, rQR % {r}{QR(I,C)}
3M. U -> C : hy% h(h(I)(+)r(+)U) , hr% h(r), vm% h( h(x,I,offer),r,h(I)(+)r(+)U)
4. C -> U : bonus
#Specification
-- Confidntiality + Issuer’s ID anonymity
--NO ATTACKS
StrongSecret(C, I , [I])
StrongSecret(C, r , [I])
StrongSecret(C, offer , [I])
StrongSecret(C, x , [I])
StrongSecret(C, rc , [U])
StrongSecret(C, pin , [U])
-- Forgery Protection:
-- No Unauthorised Generation,
-- No Manipulation.
-- If we identify the M-coupon with x, offer and I.
--NO ATTACK
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,I])
-- Not transfarable
--NO ATTACK
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,I, U])
-- No Data Modification.
--NO ATTACK
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,I,U,r])
-- user authintecation
-- ATTACK
Agreement(U,C,[U,pin])
-- Multible cash-ins
--NO ATTACK
--Agreement(I,C,[x,offer,I])
#Actual variables
User, Mallory :Users
Issuer: Issuers
Cashier: Cashiers
Bonus : Bonuses
Offer : Offers
X: Secret
R,Rc, Rm : Random
Pin, Pin2 : Password
#Functions
symbolic QR
#System
INITIATOR(User,Cashier, Rc,Pin)
RESPONDER1(Issuer, Cashier,R,X, Offer)
RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer,User, Bonus,X, Offer,Pin)
-- Multible cash-ins
--RESPONDER2(Cashier, Issuer,Mallory, Bonus,X, Offer, Pin2)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = { Cashier,Mallory,User,Rm}
Figure 7.2: CasperFDR modelling of the Hsiang et al. (QR-based) protocol
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• Second, modelling the quadratic residue theorem, where we propose two ways of abstracting QR in
the model with the pros and cons of both methods. The QR used in this protocol is assumed to be
indeed computationally infeasible since this is the basis for the protocol. Any claimed secret values
utilising QR are therefore assumed to be secret in this analysis. The model is not concerned with any
mathematical attacks against the QR (cryptanalysis) and, in that way, deals with it as if it is a secure
and robust encryption algorithm.
We suggest two ways to abstract the QR function in CasperFDR:
1. Sending the secret value under QR in clear, and hide it from the user by using % procedure, and
hide it from the intruder by adjusting the channels 2aQR and 3bQR, where the intruder can do
nothing, as follows:
#Channels
2aQR C NF NRA NR
3bQR C NF NRA NR
A disadvantage of this is that it abstracts any attack that could occur on the QR, such as a replay
attack, and as such it would be hard to justify.
2. Modelling QR as a shared secret key between the issuer and the cashier. Any value utilising the
QR to be secret is encrypted with a normal encryption algorithm and a key named as QR . The
shared secret key method is equivalent to QR from a secrecy perspective and both of them need
some initial secret values. The advantage of modelling through the shared secret key is that it
is as secure as QR (secrecy of hidden values), and as vulnerable as the QR (e.g. replay attack),
where any attack against the QR can be detected.
We choose this way of abstraction. We model the QR as a shared secret key between the issuer
and the cashier QR(I,C), see #Protocol description messages 2aQR and 3bQR.
In #System all participants engage in the protocol only once, except on the occasion where the cashier
is engaging twice to examine No Multiple Cash-in property.
7.3.2 The protocol’s requirements
This section illustrates the modelling and capturing of properties of the protocol from CasperFDR and CSP
perspectives.
Confidentiality & Issuer’s ID anonymity
Confidentiality and Issuer’s ID anonymity are modelled in CasperFDR as follows:
Confidentiality- QR Based : StrongSecret(C, X,Offer,ID(i),r, [I])
Confidentiality- QR Based : StrongSecret(C, rc, [U])
Cashier C claims that X, Offer, ID(i) and r are confidential shared with issuer I. StrongSecret checks
whether the intruder is able to break the claims without completing the protocol. As the M-coupon includes
the issuer identity, this specification will check the Issuer’s ID anonymity property as well.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the secrecy specification between the issuer and the cashier. When cashier C
performs the Claim Secret.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).r event, it can expect X, Offer, ID(i) and r to be secret with
issuer I. If this is violated, the intruder can complete a run of the protocol with the cashier without taking
the issuer’s role, and learn some of the secret values.
Even though the Issuer’s ID anonymity property is included within Confidentiality, it can be modelled
separately with Claim Secret.C.I.ID(i) event.
Forgery Protection
Forgery protection is modelled in CasperFDR as follows:
Forgery Protection- QR Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(i)])
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User's Mobile Cashier
1
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Issuer
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u)
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i)
Claim_Secret.C.I.ID(i)
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u).r.PIN
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u).r.PIN
ID(u)
M = {Y, R, h(y), h(r), Vm}
BONUS
ID(u), E, P and M
E = RC ⊕ PIN 
P = hPIN[ ID(u), RC ]    
3
4
Mallory
3' ID(u), E, P and M
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i)
y = h[ID(i)] ⊕ r ⊕ ID(u) 
Y = y2 mod n 
R = r2 mod n
Vm = hvi[r, y]   
Running.U.C.PIN
Commit.U.C.PIN
Claim_Secret.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).r
Figure 7.3: Capturing Hsiang et al. (QR-based) NFC M-coupon requirements
This states that if a cashier accepts X, Offer and ID(i), then the issuer must have issued them. NonIn-
jective means that it is not concerned with repeats, i.e. the cashier can accept a number of times what has
been issued only once. This is violated if the cashier accepts X, Offer and ID(i) that have not been issued
by the issuer. This implies either that X, Offer or ID(i) have been created by an intruder (i.e. Unauthorised
Generation) or that an M-coupon generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipula-
tion). Hence, if this property holds then there is Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised Generation and No
Manipulation.
This is illustrated in Figure 7.3. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i) event, which means issuer I starts a running of the protocol, apparently, with
cashier C, agreeing on X, Offer and ID(i). Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i)
event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means that cashier C has finished the protocol with issuer
I, agreeing on the X, Offer and ID(i).
Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable)
Not Transferable is modelled in CasperFDR as follows:
Not Transferable- QR Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(i),ID(u)])
A stronger specification than forgery protection is Not Transferable. The Not Transferable requires also
an agreement on user identity. The coupon, [X, Offer, ID(i)], must be attached to one user only ID(u).
Both the issuer and cashier agree on the user to use the coupon as many times as they like, as long as the
coupon has been issued by a genuine issuer, and is being used by the intended user.
This is shown in Figure 7.3. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u) event, which means issuer I starts a running of the protocol, appar-
ently, with cashier C, agreeing on X, Offer, ID(i) and ID(u). Later, the cashier will perform the Com-
mit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u) event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means that cashier C has
finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on the X, Offer, ID(i) and ID(u).
If it holds, not only then must the M-coupon be genuine, as for forgery protection, but it also must have
the same user.
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Data Integrity
Data Integrity is modelled in CasperFDR as follows:
Data Integrity- QR Based : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(i),ID(u),r])
This will check the integrity of the protocol between the issuer and the cashier. Both the cashier
and issuer must agree on all the information in the protocol. This is shown in Figure 7.3, the Run-
ning.I.C.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u).r event and the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i).ID(u).r.
Unauthorized Copying (User Authentication)
This is a stronger specification of Unauthorized Copying. It is an authentication between the user and the
cashier that the user is the one who he/she claims to be. We model User Authentication in CasperFDR as
follows:
User Authentication- QR Based : Agreement(U,C,[ID(u),PIN])
The user is authenticated with a password PIN shared between the user and the cashier. If this is violated,
then the authentication measure fails and the user is not properly authenticated.
This is illustrated in Figure 7.3. Just before message 3, the user performs the Running.U.C.PIN event,
which means that user U declares they are running the protocol, apparently, with the cashier C, agreeing
on PIN. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.U.PIN event at the end of its part of the protocol,
which means that cashier C has finished the protocol with user U, agreeing on PIN. Agreement will make
sure that every Running event by the user corresponds to one Commit by the cashier, which is required in
such an authentication.
No Multiple Cash-in
No Multiple Cash-in is modelled in CasperFDR as follows:
Agreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(i)])
This specification states that every time the cashier accepts X, Offer and ID(i), there must be a separate
occasion where the issuer must have issued them. Hence, a cashier cannot accept X, Offer and ID(i) more
times than an issuer sent them.
Figure 7.3 illustrates a scenario where the cashier is engaging in the protocol twice, with one issuer run.
The first time the cashier runs the protocol with the user’s mobile, and the second - illegal - time with
Mallory who might be an intruder or the user himself. The second Commit should not occur if there was
not a separate Running.
7.3.3 Intruder knowledge
Initially, the intruder knows the following: the identities of oneself ID(m), the user ID(u), the cashier ID(c),
and the hash function h, a nonce Rm and a shared key between Mallory and the cashier. The intruder does
not know the offer.
7.4 Analysis
In Table 7.2, the analysis shows no attack against all properties except the User Authentication. Figure 7.4
shows the attack trace found by CasperFDR. After the user sends their identity to a dishonest issuer (the
intruder), the intruder passes the identity to the issuer in order to get a coupon issued with the user ID.
Then, the issuer generates an M-coupon containing QR and M (see Figure 7.4 to check what QR and M
contain). As the user is waiting for an M-coupon, the intruder sends the QR, which can not be modified,
and a manipulated M (M’). At the cashing phase, the only part the intruder needs to cash the M-coupon is
the user authentication credential part (Auth). The intruder combines an Auth with the QR and M to get
70
Issuer User's MobileAttacker Cashier
User
User
QR
QR
M
M'
Auth
Auth
BONUS
Attacker
M-coupon = Auth + QR + M
QR
M
Auth = User, Rc (+) Pin, h(Pin, User, Rc)
QR = {h(Issuer) (+) R (+) User}{QR(Issuer, Cashier)}, {R}{QR(Issuer, Cashier)}
M= h(h(Issuer) (+) R (+) User), h(R), h(h(X, Issuer, Offer), R, h(Issuer) (+) R (+) User)
M’= h(h(Issuer) (+) R (+) User), h(Rm), h(h(X, Issuer, Offer), R, h(Issuer) (+) R (+) User)
Figure 7.4: The QR-based Protocol Attack Trace
a valid M-coupon. In fact, this attack suggests that a user authentication credential Auth can be attached
to any M-coupon generated for the same user, and then can be cashed by any dishonest user. There is
no relationship between the M-coupon and the authentication credential (the password PIN) except the
user’s ID. If the user has issued other M-coupons, then the intruder is able to combine different M-coupons
with different passwords. At the end of the protocol, the cashier will conclude with a false belief about the
relationship between an M-coupon and a user authentication.
On the other hand, we believe this attack is not easy to do, where the (random) password must not be
used and known to the cashier before. This requires the intruder to get the user credential without raising
the suspicion of the cashier. The fact that the user sends the M-coupon and the password together at the
same time makes it difficult for the intruder to do so, except if the intruder pretends to be the cashier.
Faking a complete cashier in a shop is quite unlikely. Therefore, this attack can be addressed by requiring
the user to send all M-coupon parts at the same time (Auth, QR and M ) with a hash of all of them in order
to enhance the integrity once the cashier checks.
During the process of analysis, an interesting observation was made, namely that CasperFDR’s be-
haviour, once we divided long messages into different parts which is fine according to the CasperFDR
manual [64], finding an attack can be affected by the sequence arrangement of these messages. This is
related to how CasperFDR places the authentication events (Running/Commit) in the protocol. We divide
the last message sent from the user to the cashier to three parts: Auth, QR and M. The attack should
be detected with any sequence arrangement of these parts but if one places the Auth part at the end, no
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Table 7.2: QR based protocol against requirements
QR based protocol
Confidentiality
√
Issuer’s ID anonymity
√
Forgery Protection
√
Data Integrity
√
No Multiple Cash in
√
Not Transferable
√
User Authentication x
attack is found. Technically, this is related to placing the Running event by the user. The user normally
performs the Running event at the last sent message. As we divide the last message into three parts, the
user considers them as three different messages and only declares the Running event at the last message
sent (M ). When the intruder gets the Auth part before running event by the user, the different parts of
the M-coupon can be combined successfully. Then, the intruder is able to complete the protocol with the
cashier when the cashier performs Commit event.
So, dividing messages into different parts can result to false attacks. Of course, the best way to avoid
such behaviour is by sending the message in one part, however this is quite difficult and sometimes even
impossible as the message is too large and CasperFDR cannot handle it. Therefore, we advise with divided
message to rearrange the order of these sub messages. If there is an attack in the protocol, it should be
detected in all orders. However, if an attack is detected because of the order of sub messages, this needs
more consideration and justification to the analysed protocol to decide whether it is a true attack.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the Hsiang et al. (QR-based) protocol, the last case study from the
literature which was an enhancement of the Hsiang et al. (Hash-based) protocol. The protocol is vulnerable
to a User Authentication attack where the user’s authentication credential is not related to the M-coupon
properly. This results in the possibility for the intruder to combine different M-coupons with a password
as long as the cashier does not know it. However, if all parts of the M-coupon are sent by the user in one
message, then this is a difficult attack to do .
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Chapter 8
New Marketing-Oriented NFC M-coupon
Protocols: Developing, Modelling and
Analysis
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose, model and analyse our Marketing-oriented NFC M-coupon protocols. The
Marketing-oriented, from its name, emphasises the main goal of these protocols: marketing. We consider
the common desirable requirements for NFC M-coupons, in which two protocols were developed to address
them based on their marketing goals. There are two kinds of marketing-oriented M-coupon protocols,
the footfall M-coupon protocol and the premium M-coupon protocol. Footfall means the number of people
entering a shop or shopping area in a given time. The footfall M-coupon protocol is used when the main
purpose of the M-coupon is to increase the number of people visiting the shop (footfall), regardless of who
is using it. On the other hand, the premium M-coupon protocol is used when the client has paid for it, and
only the intended user is allowed to cash it.
Even though each NFC M-coupon protocol in the literature has some advantages, the marketing-oriented
protocols feature all of them. The protocols are developed in the light of lessons learned from previous
analysed protocols. From a performance perspective, it is particularly inspired by the hash-based protocol
which is the best choice for the NFC system. From a business perspective, it is influenced by the Dominikus
et al. protocols where we propose two protocols suitable for M-coupon business models.
The contribution made by this chapter toward the literature is proposing, modelling and verifying two
new NFC M-coupon protocols, which meet all eight security requirements and address all previous attacks.
8.2 Protocol description
The premium M-coupon protocol addresses all NFC M-coupon security requirements mentioned in Section
4.3. The footfall M-coupon protocol addresses the same requirements except Not Transferable and User
Authentication.
As far as the Not Transferable property is concerned, it is only useful within a trusted issuing phase
which is not always the case. The fact that user ID can be faked by anyone makes combining the User
Authentication property with Not Transferable property more useful and meaningful. Therefore, the best
choice would be to use them all, the premium protocol, or drop both of them, the footfall protocol.
A feature is added in both protocols that hides the real identity of the user at the issuing phase. The
issuing phase is not as trusted as the cashing phase where the likelihood of fake issuer tags in the street are
more than fake cashiers in shops. However, we would not go as far as to state it as a protocol requirement
because user anonymity is outside the scope.
8.2.1 Footfall protocol
The footfall protocol intends to meet the following security requirements:
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Table 8.1: Footfall/Premium Protocols notations
ID(i) = Issuer ID.
ID(u) = User ID.
ID(c) = Cashier ID.
Offer = Data about the Offer .
X = A secret value between the issuer and the cashier .
X2 = A secret value between the user and the cashier .
Nu = User’s nonce (random number).
Nc = Cashier’s nonce.
Rm = Intruder’s nonce.
h[ ] = Hash function.
1. U → I : Nu
2. I → U : M-coupon = h[ID(i), X, Offer, Nu], Nu, h[ID(i)]
3. U → C: M-coupon = h[ID(i), X, Offer, Nu], Nu, h[ID(i)]
4. C → U : BONUS
Figure 8.1: The footfall M-coupon protocol
• Confidentiality
• Issuer’s ID anonymity
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
Figure 8.1 shows the footfall M-coupon protocol. There are four messages in this protocol. After the
user brings their mobile close to the issuer, the mobile sends a random number Nu (message 1). Then, the
Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user (message 2). The M-coupon contains a hash of the issuer identity, the
secret value X, the promised offer and the user random number. It also includes a hash of the issuer identity
with the user’s random number. Then, the user brings their mobile near the cashier and sends the M-coupon
(message 3). From the hashes’ table of issuers’ identities, the cashier uses h[ID(i)] to find the corresponding
ID(i), secret X and the offer. The cashier can check the validity of the M-coupon. Through the nonce
Nu the cashier can manage the M-coupons because every issued M-coupon has a unique random number.
The cashier can, for example, stop using the M-coupon after five uses. Finally, if all these conditions are
satisfied, then the bonus is given to the user (message 4).
Confidentiality, Data Integrity and Forgery Protection requirements are ensured by the use of the secret
value X and offer which will be only known by the issuer and the cashier. No Multiple Cash-in can be
managed by including the nonce.
8.2.2 Premium protocol
The Premium protocol is designed to meet all eight security requirements:
• Confidentiality
• Issuer’s ID anonymity
• Forgery Protection:
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1. U → I : h[ID(u)], Nu
2. I → U : M-coupon
3. C → U : Nc , ID(c)
4. U → C : M-coupon , Nu, ID(u) , h[Nc , X2 , ID(c) , ID(u)]
5. C → U : BONUS
M-coupon = h[ID(i) , X , Offer , h[ID(u)] , Nu ] , h[ID(i)]
Figure 8.2: The premium M-coupon protocol
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Unauthorized Copying
– Not Transferable
– User Authentication
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
The main enhancement in this protocol is attaching an authentic user identity to the coupon, i.e. ad-
dressing Not Transferable and User Authentication.
Figure 8.2 illustrates the premium M-coupon protocol. The user’s mobile sends a hash of their identity
ID(u) to the issuer (message 1). Then, the Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user (message 2). The M-
coupon contains a hash of: the issuer identity, the secret X, the offer, and the hashed user’s identity in
addition to a hash to the issuer’s identity. At the cashing phase, the cashier sends their identity and a nonce
Nc (message 3). At message 4, the user sends the M-coupon, the user identity, the user’s nonce Nu, with a
new hash containing: Nc, the secret value X2 (e.g. a password), the cashier identity and the user identity.
The cashier can send the bonus based on verifying the two hashes in message 4. From the hashes’ table
of issuers’ identities, the cashier uses h[ID(i)] to find the corresponding ID(i), secret X and the offer, with
user identity known from message 4, the cashier can check the validity of the M-coupon. The second hash,
which authenticates the user, the cashier uses ID(u) to find the corresponding secret X2, and combines it
with already known data (Nc, ID(c), ID(u)) to check the validity of the second hash. The cashier can link
the M-coupon hash with the second one by checking that both of them include the same identity ID(u) and
nonce Nu.
8.3 Modelling
8.3.1 The protocol: messages and system
The M-coupon is identified with X, Offer and Nu for both the footfall and the premium protocols.
Figure 8.3 shows the CasperFDR script of the footfall protocol. The part that the user passes to
the cashier is h(I,nu,offer,x)%w without any verification, messages 2 and 3. #System shows that all
participants are engaging in the protocol only once, except the cashier, who will run twice when checking
No Multiple Cash-in property.
Figure 8.4 shows the CasperFDR script of the premium protocol. The user passes h(I,offer,x,
h(U),nu)%w part to the cashier without any verification, #Protocol description messages 3 and 4.
#System shows that all participants are engaging in the protocol only once, except the cashier will run twice
when checking No Multiple Cash-in property.
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
h : HashFunction
offer : Offers
bonus : Bonuses
x : Secret
nu : Random
InverseKeys = (x,x)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U,nu)
RESPONDER1(I,C,x,offer)
RESPONDER2(C,I,bonus,x,offer)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I,C
1. U -> I : nu
2. I -> U : h(I),nu, h(I,nu,offer,x)%w
3. U -> C : h(I),nu, w%h(I,nu,offer,x)
4. C -> U : bonus
#Specification
--No Eavesdropping, (i.e. Confidntiality)
-- No ATTACK
StrongSecret(C, x , [I])
StrongSecret(C, offer , [I])
StrongSecret(C, I , [I])
-- Forgery Protection:
-- No Unauthorised Generation,
-- No Manipulation.
-- No ATTACK
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu])
-- No Data Modification.
-- No ATTACK
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu,I])
-- No Multiple Cash-in
-- ATTACK FOUND: but it can be manged with the nonce.
--Agreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu])
#Actual variables
User, Mallory :Users
Issuer: Issuers
Cashier: Cashiers
Nu ,Nm : Random
Bonus : Bonuses
Offer, Offer’ : Offers
X: Secret
InverseKeys = (X,X)
#System
INITIATOR(User,Nu)
RESPONDER1(Issuer,Cashier,X,Offer)
RESPONDER2(Cashier,Issuer,Bonus, X,Offer)
--RESPONDER2(Cashier,Issuer,Bonus, X,Offer)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {User,Cashier,Mallory,Nm}
Figure 8.3: CasperFDR modelling of the footfall protocol
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#Free variables
U : Users
I : Issuers
C : Cashiers
h : HashFunction
offer : Offers
x ,x2 : Secret
nu ,nc: Random
bonus : Bonuses
InverseKeys = (x,x) , (x2,x2)
#Processes
INITIATOR(U,x2,nu)
RESPONDER1(I,C,x,offer)
RESPONDER2(C,I,U,bonus,x,offer,nc,x2)
#Protocol description
0. -> U : I
1. U -> I : h(U), nu
2. I -> U : h(I), h(I , offer,x, h(U),nu )%w
3. C -> U : nc , C
4. U -> C : h(I), w% h(I , offer,x, h(U),nu ) ,nu ,U , h(nc,x2,C,U)
5. C -> U : bonus
#Specification
--No Eavesdropping, (i.e. Confidntiality)
-- Issuer anonymity
StrongSecret(C, x , [I])
StrongSecret(C, offer , [I])
StrongSecret(C, I , [I])
StrongSecret(C, x2 , [U])
-- Forgery Protection:
-- No Unauthorised Generation,
-- No Manipulation.
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer])
-- Not transfarable
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,U])
-- No Data Modification.
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,I,U])
-- No Multiple Cash-in
--Agreement(I,C,[x,offer])
-- User Authentecation
Agreement(U,C,[x2,U])
#Actual variables
User,User2, Mallory :Users
Issuer: Issuers
Cashier: Cashiers
Bonus : Bonuses
X ,X2, X22, Xm : Secret
Offer , Offer’: Offers
Nm,Nc ,Nc2, Nu : Random
InverseKeys = (X,X), (X2,X2), (Xm,Xm), (X22,X22)
#System
INITIATOR(User,X2,Nu)
RESPONDER1(Issuer,Cashier,X,Offer)
RESPONDER2(Cashier,Issuer,User,Bonus, X,Offer,Nc,X2)
--RESPONDER2(Cashier,Issuer,Mallory,Bonus, X,Offer,Nc2,X22)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Mallory, Cashier , Xm, Nm }
Figure 8.4: CasperFDR modelling of the premium protocol
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User's Mobile Cashier
1
2
Issuer
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(i)
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu
Claim_Secret.C.I.X.Offer
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(i)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu
Nu
M-coupon
BONUS
M-coupon
 M-coupon =
 h[ ID(i) , X , Offer ,Nu ] ,  
Nu, h[ ID(i) ]
3
4
Mallory
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu
3' M-coupon
Claim_Secret.C.I.ID(i)
Figure 8.5: Capturing the footfall M-coupon protocol properties
8.3.2 The protocol’s requirements
Confidentiality & Issuer’s ID anonymity
For the footfall protocol, we model confidentiality, and Issuer’s ID anonymity, in CasperFDR as follows
(#Specification at Figure 8.3):
Confidentiality- Footfall : StrongSecret(C, X,Offer,[I])
Issuer’s ID anonymity- Footfall : StrongSecret(C, ID(i), [U])
Cashier C claims that X, Offer and ID(i) are confidential, shared only with issuer I. StrongSecret checks
whether the intruder is able to break the claims without completing the protocol. As the M-coupon includes
the issuer identity, this specification will check the Issuer’s ID anonymity property as well.
Figure 8.5 illustrates the secrecy specification between the issuer and the cashier. When cashier C
performs the Claim Secret.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i) event, it can expectX, Offer and ID(i) to be secret with issuer
I. If this is violated, then the intruder can complete a run of the protocol with the cashier not taking the
issuer’s role, and learn some of the secret values.
For the premium protocol, we model confidentiality, and Issuer’s ID anonymity, in CasperFDR as
follows (#Specification at Figure 8.4):
Confidentiality- Premium: StrongSecret(C, X,Offer, [I])
Confidentiality- Premium: StrongSecret(C, X2, [U])
Issuer’s ID anonymity- Premium: StrongSecret(C, ID(i), [U])
Cashier C claims that X, Offer and ID(i) are confidential between it and issuer I. In addition, the cashier
C claims that X2 is confidential between it and user U. StrongSecret checks whether the intruder is able
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Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u)
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu
Claim_Secret.C.I.X.Offer.X2
Commit.C.U.X2.ID(u)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu
Running.U.C.X2.ID(u)
h[ ID(u) ], Nu
M-coupon
BONUS
Nc, ID(c)
M-coupon =
 h[ ID(i) , X , Offer , h[ ID(u) ], Nu ] 
 h[ ID(i) ] 
3
4
Mallory
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu
M-coupon , Nu, ID(u), 
 h[ Nu, Nc, X2,  ID(c), ID(u) ]
   
5
4'
M-coupon , Nu, ID(u), 
 h[ Nu, Nc, X2,  ID(c), ID(u) ]
   
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u).ID(i)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u).ID(i)
Claim_Secret.C.I.ID(i)
Figure 8.6: Capturing the premium M-coupon protocol properties
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to break the claims without completing the protocol. As the M-coupon includes the issuer identity, this
specification will check the Issuer’s ID anonymity property as well.
Figure 8.6 illustrates the secrecy specification between the issuer and the cashier. When cashier C
performs the Claim Secret.C.I.X.Offer.ID(i) event, it can expectX, Offer and ID(i) to be secret with issuer
I. If this is violated, then the intruder can complete a run of the protocol with the cashier without taking
the issuer’s role, and learn some of the secret values.
Even though the Issuer’s ID anonymity property is included with the Confidentiality property, it can be
modelled separately in the footfall and the premium protocols with the Claim Secret.C.I.ID(i) event.
Forgery Protection
Forgery protection is modelled for the footfall and the premium protocols in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification
at Figures 8.3 and 8.4):
Forgery Protection- footfall : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu])
Forgery Protection- premium: NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu])
The M-coupon is identified with X, Offer and Nu. This states that if a cashier accepts X, Offer and
Nu, then the issuer must have issued them. The cashier can accept a number of times what has been issued
only once. This is violated if the cashier accepts X, Offer and Nu that have not been issued by the issuer.
This implies either thatX, Offer and Nu have been created by an attacker (i.e. Unauthorised Generation)
or that an M-coupon generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipulation). Hence,
if this property holds then one has Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised Generation and No Manipulation.
This is illustrated in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol,
it performs the Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu event, which means that issuer I starts a running of the proto-
col, apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on X, Offer and Nu. Later, the cashier will perform the Com-
mit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means cashier C has finished the
protocol with issuer I, agreeing on the X, Offer and Nu.
Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable)
We model Not Transferable only for the premium protocol, in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification at
Figure 8.4):
Not Transferable- premium: NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu,ID(u)])
This specification is similar to forgery protection specification, but also includes an agreement on a user
identity. The coupon, [X, Offer, Nu], must be attached to one user only ID(u). Both the issuer and the
cashier agree on the user to use the coupon as many times as they like, as long as the coupon has been
issued by a genuine issuer, and is being used by the intended user.
This is shown in Figure 8.6. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol, it performs the
Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u) event, which means that issuer I starts a running of the protocol, appar-
ently, with cashier C, agreeing on X, Offer, Nu and ID(u). Later, the cashier will perform the Com-
mit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u) event at the end of its part of the protocol, which means that cashier C has
finished the protocol with issuer I, agreeing on the X, Offer, Nu and ID(u).
Data Integrity
Data Integrity is modelled for the footfall and the premium protocols in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification
at Figures 8.3 and 8.4):
Forgery Protection- footfall : NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu,ID(i)])
Forgery Protection- premium: NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu,ID(u),ID(i)])
This will check the integrity of the protocol. Both the cashier and issuer must agree on all the information
in the protocol. For the footfall protocol, this is shown in Figure 8.5, the Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(i)
event and the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(i).
For the premium protocol, this is illustrated in 8.6, the Running.I.C.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u).ID(i) event and
the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.Nu.ID(u).ID(i).
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Table 8.2: Marketing based protocol against requirements
Footfall Premium
Confidentiality
√ √
Issuer’s ID anonymity
√ √
Forgery Protection
√ √
Data Integrity
√ √
No Multiple Cash in
√ √
Not Transferable
√
User Authentication
√
Unauthorized Copying (User Authentication)
User Authentication is modelled in CasperFDR for only the premium protocol as follows (#Specification
at Figure 8.4):
User Authentication- premium: Agreement(U,C,[X2,ID(u)])
The user is authenticated with the shared secret X2 between the user and the cashier. If this is violated,
then the authentication measure fails and the user is not properly authenticated.
This is illustrated in Figure 8.5. Just before message 4, the user performs the Running.U.C.X2.ID(u)
event, which means user U declares they are running the protocol, apparently, with cashier C, agreeing on
X2 and ID(u). Then, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.U.X2.ID(u) event at the end of its part of the
protocol, which means that cashier C has finished the protocol with user U, agreeing on X2 and ID(u).
No Multiple Cash-in
Forgery protection is modelled for the footfall and the premium protocols in CasperFDR as follows (#Specification
at Figures 8.3 and 8.4):
Forgery Protection- footfall : Agreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu])
Forgery Protection- premium: Agreement(I,C,[X,Offer,Nu])
This specification states that every time the cashier accepts X, Offer and Nu, there must be a separate
occasion where the issuer must have issued them. Hence, cashier cannot accept X, Offer and Nu more times
than an issuer has sent them.
Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 illustrate a scenario where the cashier is engaging in the protocol twice, with
one issuer run. The first time, the cashier runs the protocol with the user’s mobile, and the second - illegal
- time with Mallory who might be an intruder or the user himself. The second Commit should not occur if
there was not a separate Running.
8.3.3 Intruder knowledge
The intruder knows the following: its own identity ID(m), the cashier ID(c), the hash function h and a
nonce Rm. The intruder does not know the offer.
8.3.4 Assumptions
We made no assumptions in these solutions, except the Dolev-Yao model assumptions.
8.4 Analysis and discussion
We formally verify the security of the footfall and the premium protocols. Table 8.2 shows the addressed
properties in both protocols, and Table 8.3 illustrates an overview of all M-coupon protocols analysed so far
against intended, addressed, and failed requirements.
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8.5 Conclusion
After the analysis of a couple of existing protocols in the literature, in this chapter we have provided a solution
that built upon, and were inspired by, the previous protocols where the advantages and the disadvantages
were considered. The marketing-based protocols address all requirements with light computational means
i.e. hash-based functions. We formally verified the marketing-based protocols by CasperFDR, and found
no attack.
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Chapter 9
User Key Confirmation Protocols:
Addressing NFC Mobile Relay attacks
9.1 Introduction
So far, we addressed specific NFC M-coupon security requirements in the previous chapters. In this chapter
we address the remaining general threat (relay attack) to NFC and, as a result, to the NFC M-coupon
protocols. The previous chapters were about a systematic approach for securing NFC M-coupon protocols
by analysing and fixing existing protocols, and introducing new protocols. As stated in the threat model,
we are not concerned with relay attack in the formal security analysis of NFC M-coupon protocols. The
reason was that the attack is a general attack against RFID/NFC protocols, and cryptographic measures
are believed not to be sufficient in addressing the attack on its own. The main danger of the relay attack
is the fact that the attack works even with secure protocols. Therefore, in this chapter we tackle the NFC
mobile relay attack problem in order to address a limitation in the formal analysis.
The relay attacks manipulate the proximity factor between entities. The attacker relays the signal
between two distant parties while both of them believe they are next to each other.
There are a number of non-cryptographic measures for addressing the relay attack. Distance bounding
protocols (DB) [16, 6, 74, 58, 59, 72, 95, 89, 82, 45, 20, 18] are a group of protocols which measure the
round-trip time taken to transfer some information between two engaging parties. This imposes a limit
based on the transmission speed of information. If there is a delay, then this suggests the time taken is more
than needed either by internal or external intruder. The delay indicates an attacker may be relaying the
channel. DB protocols make the relay attack very difficult for the attacker and provide the best solution
so far for the passive contactless cards. DB protocols intend to address internal [16, 27], external [30, 7] or
both internal/external intruders [30]. Finally, DB protocols are not suitable for NFC channels [42].
However, there are some disadvantages with DB protocols. The fact that both parties require additional
time because of computational processes, it is difficult to measure the round-trip latency caused by the
different computational process required by both parties. As a result, it would not be known whether the
real reason for the latency is a computational reason or an attacker relaying the communication. Because
of the computational process problem, DB protocols have been developed with an assumption of a constant
computational time. In addition, DB protocols try to address security requirements in entity authentication
beside proximity authentication. Even though entity authentication requirements are important, they are
not the main requirement of the DB protocol. The DB protocols were invented firstly for addressing proxim-
ity authentication, while entity authentication was included to make a complete protocol that addresses both
requirements. The DB protocols address more security requirements than needed, focusing on improving
the less important requirements (i.e. entity authentication). On the other hand, it is a reasonable argument
that it is difficult to apply a normal entity authentication protocol alongside a proximity proof protocol
(bit round-trip) because of the limited choices in a passive contactless card (e.g. a contactless credit card)
and the nature of the proximity proof. However, assuming a constant computational time, which breaks
the core element of measuring the bit round-trip, and focusing on entity authentication issues are a major
disadvantage in these protocols. In theory, the security of DB protocols can be proven mathematically [13],
but applying them in practice is questionable and requires further research. Finally, DB protocols are not
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suitable for NFC channels [42].
A different approach is by using RF “fingerprint” [81, 28] associated with each device, where the intruder
would not be able to have the same “fingerprint” of a proxy device. However, generating a fingerprint to
each device is not a practical solution [38].
Another approach measures the ambient conditions between parties [92]. This is based on the fact that
if the engaging parties are in close proximity, then they should share similar ambient conditions such as
GPS, sound, light or temperature. However, the accuracy of these measures is a major concern. A GPS
signal needs an outside clear environment. Light and sound may be affected by the source’s direction or
interferences. Temperature can be quite similar in two far places. Not to mention if these measures require
additional equipment to measure the ambient conditions. Nonetheless, advantages of the ambient conditions
solutions are that they focus on the main problem by seeking to prove the proximity. Additionally, they
also can be implemented on top of any cryptographic protocols.
The final approach is by engaging the user either by requiring them to carry another device [5] or by
utilising NFC button solutions. The NFC button is used either as a turn on/off NFC function [65, 3] or for
measuring the time between showing and pressing buttons showed on both devices [57]. A disadvantage of
this approach is that it relies on the user significantly.
As far as the current relay attack measures are concerned, an ideal solution should feature the following:
1. Response time should not be a critical factor due to the difficulty associated with measuring it.
2. Focusing on the main problem (proving proximity).
3. The ability to run on top of, or within, normal cryptographic protocols.
4. Easy to apply where no additional equipment is required.
5. Accurate in detecting relay attacks.
We propose NFC User Key Confirmation protocols (NFC UKC). NFC UKC protocols overcome issues
related to the current relay attack countermeasures. The three main elements of UKC protocols are illus-
trated in Figure 9.1: Cryptography, NFC mobile and the user. NFC UKC protocols, to address the relay
attack, utilise a proper cryptographic measure (a key confirmation protocol) in conjunction with a user
engagement found in the contemporarily powerful NFC mobiles.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 9.2 discusses different issues related to the relay attack
in order to have a clear understanding of the problem and how to solve it. Section 9.3 demonstrates the
main idea of the proposed NFC UKC protocols. Then, we illustrate the UKC protocols in the three modes
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of operations: card emulation mode in Section 9.4, peer-to-peer in Section 9.5, and reader/writer mode in
Section 9.6. The discussion and residual risks are in Section 9.7. Finally, in Section 9.8 we formally verify
the security of the NFC UKC protocols using CasperFDR.
9.2 Relay attack
Figure 9.2 shows the relay attack in RFID/NFC domain, in which a relay attack happens when a contactless
reader cannot distinguish between the real contactless card and the proxy-card [40]. This is applicable as
well if the two parties are NFC mobiles [38, 84]. The relaying channel can be Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or Internet
managed by the intruder (Mallory). Intruders in relay attacks can be external or the internal. The intruder
can pretend to be Bob, or Alice, if they have a relay channel of the communication between Alice and Bob,
while for example Alice believes that she is communicating with Bob in close proximity. The intruder is
external if all parties are honest, and an “external” attacker relays the communication while the honest
parties think they are close to each other.
The broken property in a relay attack is a proximity proof property not an entity authentication property.
9.2.1 Relay attack and cryptographic protocols
Entity authentication protocols [49] are used for the purpose of authenticating one entity to another. When
authenticating an entity in the Internet domain, proximity is not assumed and passing messages from one
router to another is normal. However, in the RFID/NFC domain proximity is a critical assumption. While
relaying messages in Internet protocols is not considered an attack, it is considered an attack in RFID/NFC
protocols. The reason is that a promised value given at the end of an RFID/NFC authentication protocol
would be given to the one who is physically present at the reader, even if that was an intruder relaying
the communication from a distant honest user, for example accessing a train gate or cashing a coupon for
a free coffee. The entity authentication protocols work at distance and the analysis threat model does not
include proximity. Therefore, applying a normal user authentication protocol, suitable for the Internet,
is not necessarily applicable to the RFID/NFC protocols. The relay attack is an additional challenge in
RFID/NFC protocols.
However, a relay attack normally occurs on authentication protocols rather than key establishment
protocols. Even if the intruder relays the communication in key establishment protocols, no benefit will be
gained except if there was a flaw in the protocol itself where the intruder is able to know the new key. Key
establishment is not concerned with proximity, whereas authentication can be, especially in the RFID/NFC
domain.
Normally, key establishment protocols are divided into two main protocols. First, a key generation
protocol is used to establish a fresh secret key between parties. Second, in a key confirmation protocol each
entity has to prove that it has the correct key (e.g. encrypting a new nonce with the new key).
The solution to this is that the relay attack can be addressed by utilising the key confirmation protocol.
The main idea of addressing the relay attack in NFC mobile is by engaging the users for the key confirmation
protocol. The key confirmation protocol would be a shared mission between the cryptographic protocol and
the end user. The mission related to the cryptographic protocol is that it is responsible for delivering a
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challenge, e.g. nonce, to the user encrypted under an agreed key. The mission related to the user is that
the user is responsible for proving the knowledge of that challenge physically through the user themselves,
which is the core idea of the NFC UKC protocols.
9.2.2 Threat model
We call a relay attack simple when the intruder interacts with a contactless card/NFC mobile without the
user’s awareness. A turn on/off button for NFC function is a direct security measure for addressing such an
attack, as suggested in the literature [65, 3]. The idea is to enable the NFC function only if it is explicitly
activated by the user. In addition, the on/off button should include disabling the NFC touch-and-go feature.
The NFC touch-and-go feature is when developing an NFC application a user could be given the choice to
start the communication directly without any confirmation. Moreover, the on/off button should include
disabling NFC function when the battery of the NFC device is dead.
An advanced relay attack is when the user is fully aware of a transaction and the intruder manages to
do another transaction on behalf of the user.
There are two kind of the advanced relay attack, with internal [16, 27], external [30, 7] and both inter-
nal/external intruders [30]. An internal advanced relay attack occurs when one of the engaging parties is
dishonest e.g. a dishonest user who collaborates with an attacker to perform a relay attack. Whereas, an
external advanced relay attack occurs when all parties are honest and an external attacker who tries to relay
the communication.
The proposed solution, the NFC UKC protocols, addresses the external advanced relay attack, and are
intended for defence against external attackers with the assumption that the users are honest.
9.3 NFC User Key Confirmation Protocols
NFC mobiles have revolutionised the concept of contactless cards. NFC mobiles are more powerful than
just passive contactless cards in terms of two additional features: operating in different modes and opening
a channel to interact with the user. In fact, one requires mobiles to show in practice that a key confirmation
protocol is better than an entity authentication protocol for addressing the relay attack. The reason is that
the key confirmation protocol requires a response by the user through the contactless card which becomes
possible in NFC mobiles.
9.3.1 Terminology
• NFC mobile: an NFC mobile can be a smart phone or a tablet with an NFC technology.
• Reader: a reader is a contactless reader supported with a touch screen and has a relationship (shared
secret/password) with users, e.g. a train gate or a coffee cashier.
• Contactless card/ Tag: is a passive object only activated by the power of other NFC devices, stores
some information and is able to perform basic encryption/decryption, e.g. contactless credit card or
a tag in a poster issuing coupons.
• Users: a user is a person who carries the NFC mobile. The participation of a user in NFC UKC
protocols depends on the NFC device used but at least one is necessarily. We assume that an interactive
user does not necessarily exist behind an NFC reader and a contactless card.
• Prover: as a protocol role, an entity is a Prover when it is required to prove its proximity.
• Verifier: as a protocol role, an entity is a Verifier when it verifies a proximity authentication of a
Prover.
9.3.2 Proximity authentication methods
There are two main methods in which a device can prove its proximity in the UKC protocols, Proximity
Token and Proximity Challenge/Response. The user can prove to other NFC devices that their NFC mobile
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Figure 9.3: Methods of proximity authentication in the NFC User Key Confirmation protocols
is in a close distance by performing Proximity Challenge/Response with other NFC devices. On the other
hand, the user can verify the proximity of other NFC devices by making an informed decision on whether
the other NFC device is in close distance by an entity’s Proximity Token. The user and the NFC mobile
together share the proving/verifying process. Both methods are explained in the following sections.
Proximity Token
As illustrated in Figure 9.3a, this method is for the reader and the contactless card (Prover) to prove
their proximity to the user who carry the NFC mobile (Verifiers). The Prover sends its Proximity Token
(PrxTok) to the user, through the user’s NFC mobile. The verification step is shared between the NFC
mobile and the user. The NFC mobile manages the encryption/decryption of the PrxTok between the user
and other devices. The user is the one who makes a decision of the PrxTok ’s authenticity. The PrxTok is
a message that includes information which enables the user to verify the proximity of the Prover, including
the following:
• Information about the Prover. The aim is that the Prover tells the user about itself so that the
user can make a decision whether the description of the Prover is the same one that the user is
dealing with. Prover’s information may include location, name, a photo from the user’s point of view
(the shop, the cashier or the point of sale), the name of the employer, etc. For example {Location:
Starbucks Guildford, employer: Jams}
• Information about the user (the Verifier). The Prover tells the user what it believes about the user,
so that the user can make sure it is the one who the Prover believes it is. Information includes name,
location, etc. If information about the NFC mobile was included as well, this would enhance the
security more. For example {Registration Location: London, User name: Ali}
• Information about the process that is being done between the Prover and the user such as price,
transaction details, etc. For example {Amount: £21.5, Time: 15:02}
The security of the PrxTok is vital. An external intruder can not know PrxTok even if relaying the
communication because information is encrypted and decrypted at the application layer and confirmed at
the user’s level. If the intruder relays the PrxTok, the user would be able to tell the contradictions in the
PrxTok(s). In addition, it is very difficult to create such information because this information is either
variable (e.g. the name of the employer, current date and amount of the transaction) or static that it would
be detected by the user if faked (e.g. cashier location). Even if one assumes an intruder is able to fake a
PrxTok, it would be impossible to send it without knowing the shared key as PrxTok is always encrypted.
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Table 9.1: UKC protocols security characteristics
Entity authentication Proximity proof
Unilateral Mutual
Intruder
Unilateral Mutual
Intruder
Internal External Internal External
UKC card emulation
√ √ √ √
X
√
UKC peer-to-peer
√ √ √ √
X
√
UKC writer/reader
√ √ √ √
X
√
Proximity Challenge/Response
As illustrated in Figure 9.3b, the other approach is for the user with an NFC mobile (Provers) to physically
prove their proximity to other devices (Verifier). Here, the Verifier is a reader or another NFC mobile.
The user with the NFC mobile can prove the proximity to the reader and another NFC mobile but not a
contactless card because the user’s engagement is vital which not possible in a contactless card. Proximity
Challenge/Response method includes the following steps:
1. Verifier generates a proximity challenge and sends it to the user’s mobile encrypted with a shared key.
2. The user’s mobile shows the proximity challenge to the user by decrypting the proximity challenge
with the shared key.
3. The user themselves prove to the Verifier the knowledge of the proximity challenge by a correct
proximity response.
The nature of the proximity challenge takes different forms depending on the device used such as picture
or word. However, proximity response must be done through the user.
The random picture/word can only be known after the user interacts with the prover. Knowing the
picture/word after finishing the protocol is harmless as one uses the random picture/word for a one time
authentication not secrecy. Moreover, the user will not start interacting with a prover, which may be an
external intruder, except if the PrxTok is approved.
9.3.3 Security characteristics
Table 9.1 shows the security characteristics of the NFC UKC protocols. The NFC UKC in all three modes
of operations provide both mutual entity authentications and mutual proximity proofs, except for the UKC
writer/reader mode where only unilateral proximity proof is provided. Entity authentication addresses both
internal and external intruders. Proximity proof addresses only external intruders, and controlling internal
attacks can be done through the system policy, for example a penalty or prevention from using the system.
Finally, a key generation protocol is required for the NFC UKC protocols. Entities must either share
a key before the beginning of the UKC protocol, or they have just gone through a key generation protocol
resulting in a new fresh key. The NFC UKC protocols are illustrated with the use of long term secret keys
shared between the entities.
9.4 NFC UKC protocol in card emulation mode
In this mode, NFC mobile emulates a contactless card and interacts with a reader. For example, mobile
wallet (credit card) and train gate applications. We propose a mutual proximity proof and mutual entity
authentication in the NFC UKC card emulation protocol.
Table 9.2 illustrates protocol notations. The protocol is as follows (messages in bold occur at the pro-
tocol layer, other messages occur in the physical world):
1. Reader → User’s mobile : {Reader, User, Reader PrxTok, Reader rPe} KReader/User’s mobile
2. User’s mobile → User : Reader PrxTok, Reader rPe
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Table 9.2: Protocol notation
Reader A contactless reader such as a train gate.
User’s mobile A mobile with NFC technology.
User, Alice and Bob The person who hold a NFC mobile.
PrxTok Proximity Token method.
rPe A random picture
rWd A random word.
K A shared key.
3. Reader → User : display 4 pictures
4. User → Reader : select Reader rPe
The shared key KReader/User’s mobile is a key shared between the reader and the user’s mobile, as we assumed
in section 9.3.3. In message 1, the reader encrypts the following:
• Both identities: Reader and User.
• Reader rPe: A random picture (a proximity challenge).
• Reader PrxTok : A PrxTok method from the reader (includes all three aspect: information about
prover, verifier and transaction e.g. the reader’s location and name, the user’s name and details about
the transaction).
Message 1, the Reader PrxTok is used by the user to authenticate the reader. The user makes a decision
whether the reader is in close proximity based on the Reader PrxTok. The user can see the random picture
Reader rPe, say an apple, on the mobile screen by decrypting the picture with the shared key (message 2).
Message 3, the reader displays the Reader rPe among other choices, say (banana, orange and grape), in
order to examine whether the user is able to choose the right picture. Finally, the user chooses the right
picture from four different pictures on a touch screen placed on the reader. The Reader rPe is like a nonce
but in addition it has a meaning which can be verified and understood by the user who has just seen it. If
the user chooses the right picture, then this indicates for the reader that the user is in close proximity.
For the proximity proof, the reader proves its proximity by a PrxTok method. The NFC mobile with the
user proves their proximity by a proximity challenge/response method. The challenge is a random picture
rPe sent to the NFC mobile by the reader, and the response is that the user chooses the right picture from
a set of pictures at a touch screen placed on the reader.
For entity authentication, the reader is authenticated to the user through the PrxTok and the shared
key. The information included in the PrxTok can be utilised as a time stamp and a random number for
authenticating the reader. The user is authenticated by the proximity challenge/response method.
9.5 NFC UKC protocol in Peer-To-Peer mode
In NFC peer-to-peer mode, two NFC mobiles are interacting with each other. We propose a mutual proximity
proof and a mutual entity authentication in the NFC UKC peer-to-peer. An example of such application is
NFC mobile-to-mobile money transactions.
Each user with an NFC mobile can verify the proximity of another NFC mobile by checking the PrxTok.
The proximity challenge/response method is used for a mutual entity authentication. Each user with an
NFC mobile performs a proximity challenge/response with another NFC mobile. The challenge is a random
word rWd chosen by the user.
The protocol is as follows (messages in bold occur at the protocol layer, other messages occur in the
physical world):
1. Alice → Alice’s mobile : Alice rWd
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2. Bob → Bob’s mobile : Bob rWd
3. Alice’s mobile → Bob’s mobile : {Alice, Bob, Alice PrxTok, Alice rWd} KAlice’s mobile/Bob’s mobile
4. Bob’s mobile → Alice’s mobile : {Bob, Alice, Bob PrxTok, Bob rWd} KAlice’s mobile/Bob’s mobile
5. Alice’s mobile → Alice : Bob PrxTok, Bob rWd
6. Bob’s mobile → Bob : Alice PrxTok, Alice rWd
7. Alice → Bob : Bob rWd
8. Bob → Alice : Alice rWd
The shared key KAlice’s mobile/Bob’s mobile is a key shared between Alice’s mobile and Bob’s mobile. In message
1, Alice types a word on her mobile and Bob does the same in message 2. In message 3, Alice’s mobile
sends (Alice, Bob, Alice PrxTok , Alice rWd) to Bob encrypted with the shared key KAlice’s mobile/Bob’s mobile,
and Bob does the same in message 4. In messages 5 and 6, random words are decrypted to Alice and Bob
through their NFC mobiles, and both of them can verify the other entity’s proximity through the PrxToks.
Finally, in message 7 Bob asks Alice to verbally verify the random word that he has sent, and Alice does
the same in message 8 where a mutual entity authentication is done.
The random word can be a random picture rPe where in message 1 and 2 both users choose a picture
from a set of pictures on their mobile screens. Then, in messages 7 and 8 both users confirm verbally the
random picture received.
9.6 NFC UKC protocol in Reader/Writer mode
In NFC reader/writer mode, the user who has a NFC mobile performs the protocol with a passive card.
Even though the protocol achieves a mutual entity authentication, only the NFC mobile usually proves its
proximity to the passive contactless card because it is difficult for the user to interact with a contactless
card or tag. The contactless card/tag proves its proximity to the user by PrxTok method. A proximity
challenge/response method is used for freshness and enhancing the security.
The protocol is as follows (messages in bold occur at the protocol layer, other messages occur in the
physical world):
1. User’s mobile → User : display 4 pictures.
2- User → User’s mobile : select User rPe.
3- User’s mobile → Tag : {User, Tag, User PrxTok , User rPe} KUser’s mobile/Tag
4. Tag → User’s mobile : {User, Tag, Tag PrxTok, User PrxTok , User rPe} KUser’s mobile/Tag
5. User’s mobile → User: Tag PrxTok, User PrxTok , User rPe.
The shared key KUser’s mobile/Tag is a key shared between the user’s mobile and the tag. In message 1, the
user’s mobile displays four pictures to the user, and the user chooses one of them User rPe (message 2). In
message 3 the user’s mobile encrypts to the tag the following: User, Tag, User PrxTok and User rPe . Here,
the User PrxTok is used for authenticating the user to the tag, but not for proving the user’s proximity. In
message 4, the tag encrypts the received (User,Tag, User PrxTok , User rPe) with the Tag PrxTok which
is stored in the tag memory. In message 5, the user checks Tag PrxTok, User PrxTok that it similar to the
one they sent and the User rPe.
9.7 Discussion and residual risks
A main difference of the UKC protocols from other relay attack countermeasures is that this solution is a
collaboration between the cryptographic protocol and the user themself for transferring the proximity proof.
This is different from approving every request by tapping the screen where the tapping process is part of a
complex cryptographic protocol.
It could be argued that user engagement is a disadvantage. However, an NFC application has a different
assumption from Internet communication where the users are engaged when presenting their mobile and
show their intention by touching the other NFC device. In fact, user engagement in the authentication
process is one of the laws of identity for successful, proper identification [19].
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In a real world application, information included inside a PrxTok should consider the usability factor by
selecting some information rather than showing all the information.
Guessing is still a residual risk. There is a chance for the intruder to guess the random picture presented
on the reader. A solution is to increase the number of pictures and to select a permutation. For example,
to present 6 pictures with two random pictures to be chosen in sequence. In this case, the possibility for the
intruder’s guess to be right would be very low (first correct guess is 1/6, followed by second guess correct
at 1/5, gives a total of 1/6 * 1/5 = 1/30 approximately 3%).
The proximity proof, in the current development of the NFC UKC protocols, does not hold with dishonest
users (internal intruders) because a distant honest user can tell a close attacker the right picture. However,
this should be addressed by the system policy to prevent such attacks.
9.8 Modelling and analysis of NFC User Key Confirmation
NFC User Key Confirmation protocols are modelled in all three modes of operations, see Figures 9.4, 9.5 and
9.6. Entity authentication properties are formally verified by Casper, but not the proximity proof properties
since Casper can not capture proximity between entities.
9.8.1 Modelling the user and their mobile
There are some messages in the model between the user and their mobile. It is unlikely for a dishonest
entity to access this range of the communication except if a malicious software is downloaded. The intruder
is assumed to have no control over the range between the user and his or her mobile. We conceal the
communication between the user and their mobile from the intruder. In order to model this channel, we
adjust the Channel section to annotate this channel as follows:
#Channels
2 C NF NRA NR
The second line means that in message 2 the intruder neither can eavesdrop C, nor fake data NF,
nor reascribe NRA or redirect NR. We apply the channel setting for the card emulation mode model in
message (2) Figure 9.4, the peer-to-peer mode in messages (1,2,5,6) Figure 9.5 and the reader/writer mode
in messages (1,4) Figure 9.6.
9.8.2 Modelling the reader’s touch screen
Another aspect of the model is capturing the act of the reader by presenting four pictures to the user who
chooses the right one. We model this as follows:
#Protocol description
0. -> reader : nfcMobile
1. reader -> nfcMobile : {reader,user, prxtok, rPe}{kab}
2. nfcMobile -> user : prxtok, rPe
3. -> reader : user
4. user -> reader : rPe
#Channels
2 C NF NRA NR
The intruder is assumed to have no control over message 2 because it occurs between the user and their
mobile. The reader starts a communication with the user at message 3. Then, the user provides the right
picture to the reader.
In order to examine this model, we run the protocol with 3 different users. CasperFDR finds no attack.
In addition, it is possible now to check if the intruder is able to know the picture (which we expect they
should) by checking this specification:
92
#Specification
StrongSecret(reader, rPe, [user])
As expected, the model fails this specification: the result is an attack with which the intruder is able to
learn the picture by the end of the protocol run. This does not affect the authentication between the reader
and the user. The knowledge of the picture after it has been used for authentication is harmless as it is
randomly generated. Secrecy of the picture is not a requirement. The requirement is authentication.
9.8.3 Modelling the proximity
Proximity is not captured in the model. It is not recommended to restrict the ability of the intruder by
capturing the proximity. Actually, we want the intruder to be able to relay the communication between all
parties. The CasperFDR threat model (Dolev-Yao) is good in this matter where it assumes the intruder has
full access to all communication channels. Thus, the protocols intend to address the relay attack by some
countermeasures with the presence of the relay attack. Capturing the proximity will restrict the intruder’s
ability and some attacks might go undetected.
We formally verified the security of these protocols and no attacks were found.
9.9 Conclusion
We proposed the NFC User Key Confirmation protocols to address the relay attack in NFC. The UKC
protocols are a collaboration between the cryptographic protocols, the user and the NFC mobile in an effort
to prove the proximity. We illustrated the UKC protocols in the three NFC modes of operations with a
formal verification by CasperFDR.
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#Free variables
reader, user, nfcMobile : Agent
prxtok : PrxToks
rPe : RandomPicture
kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (kab,kab)
#Processes
INITIATOR(reader,user,kab,prxtok, rPe)
RESPONDER(nfcMobile,user,kab)
RESPONDER2(user,reader,nfcMobile,prxtok)
#Protocol description
0. -> reader : nfcMobile
1. reader -> nfcMobile : {reader,user, prxtok, rPe}{kab}
2. nfcMobile -> user : prxtok, rPe
3. -> reader : user
4. user -> reader : rPe
#Channels
2 C NF NRA NR
#Specification
Agreement(reader, user, [rPe])
Agreement(user, reader, [prxtok])
#Actual variables
Reader, User, NfcMobile, I ,User2 , NfcMobile2,User3 ,NfcMobile3: Agent
Prxtok : PrxToks
RPe , RPe2, RPe3 : RandomPicture
Kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kab,Kab)
#System
INITIATOR(Reader,User,Kab,Prxtok, RPe)
INITIATOR(Reader,User2,Kab,Prxtok, RPe2)
INITIATOR(Reader,User3,Kab,Prxtok, RPe3)
RESPONDER(NfcMobile,User,Kab)
RESPONDER(NfcMobile2,User2,Kab)
RESPONDER(NfcMobile3,User2,Kab)
RESPONDER2(User,Reader,NfcMobile,Prxtok)
RESPONDER2(User2,Reader,NfcMobile2,Prxtok)
RESPONDER2(User3,Reader,NfcMobile2,Prxtok)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = I
IntruderKnowledge = {Reader, User,NfcMobile, I, User2,NfcMobile2,User3 ,NfcMobile3}
Figure 9.4: CasperFDR modelling of NFC UKC Card Emulation protocol
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#Free variables
alice, bob, aliceMobile, bobMobile :Agent
prxtokAlice, prxtokBob : PrxToks
aliceRWd, bobRWd : RandomWords
kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (kab,kab)
#Processes
INITIATOR(alice,bob,aliceMobile,aliceRWd,prxtokBob,prxtokAlice)
RESPONDER(bob,alice,bobMobile,bobRWd, prxtokAlice,prxtokBob)
RESPONDER2(aliceMobile,alice,bob, bobMobile, kab,prxtokAlice)
RESPONDER3(bobMobile,bob,alice,aliceMobile,kab,prxtokBob)
#Protocol description
0. -> alice : aliceMobile
1. alice -> aliceMobile : aliceRWd
2. bob -> bobMobile : bobRWd
3. aliceMobile -> bobMobile : {alice, bob, prxtokAlice, aliceRWd}{kab}
4. bobMobile -> aliceMobile : {bob, alice, prxtokBob, bobRWd}{kab}
5. aliceMobile -> alice : prxtokBob, bobRWd
6. bobMobile -> bob : prxtokAlice, aliceRWd
7. alice -> bob : bobRWd
8. bob -> alice : aliceRWd
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
2 C NF NRA NR
5 C NF NRA NR
6 C NF NRA NR
#Specification
Agreement(bob, alice, [prxtokBob,aliceRWd])
Agreement(alice, bob, [prxtokAlice,bobRWd])
#Actual variables
Alice, Bob, AliceMobile, BobMobile, I : Agent
PrxtokAlice, PrxtokBob , PrxtokI : PrxToks
AliceRWd, BobRWd, IRWd : RandomWords
Kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kab,Kab)
#System
INITIATOR(Alice,Bob,AliceMobile,AliceRWd, PrxtokBob,PrxtokAlice)
RESPONDER(Bob,Alice,BobMobile,BobRWd, PrxtokAlice,PrxtokBob)
RESPONDER2(AliceMobile,Alice,Bob,BobMobile, Kab,PrxtokAlice)
RESPONDER3(BobMobile,Bob,Alice,
AliceMobile, Kab,PrxtokBob)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = I
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice, Bob,AliceMobile, BobMobile, I,IRWd,PrxtokI}
Figure 9.5: CasperFDR modelling of NFC UKC peer-to-peer protocol
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#Free variables
tag, user, nfcMobile : Agent
prxtokUser, prxtokTag : PrxToks
rPe : RandomPicture
kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (kab,kab)
#Processes
INITIATOR(user,tag,nfcMobile,prxtokUser,prxtokTag,rPe)
RESPONDER(nfcMobile,user,tag, kab,prxtokUser)
RESPONDER2(tag,nfcMobile,kab,prxtokTag)
#Protocol description
0. -> user : nfcMobile
1. user -> nfcMobile : rPe
2. nfcMobile -> tag :{tag,user,prxtokUser,rPe}{kab}
3. tag -> nfcMobile :{tag,user,prxtokUser, rPe, prxtokTag}{kab}
4. nfcMobile -> user: prxtokUser, rPe, prxtokTag
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
4 C NF NRA NR
#Specification
Agreement(tag, user, [prxtokUser, rPe, prxtokTag])
#Actual variables
Tag, User, NfcMobile, I : Agent
PrxtokUser, PrxtokTag, PrxtokI : PrxToks
RPe,RPeI : RandomPicture
Kab : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (Kab,Kab)
#System
INITIATOR(User,Tag,NfcMobile,PrxtokUser, PrxtokTag,RPe)
RESPONDER(NfcMobile,User,Tag, Kab,PrxtokUser)
RESPONDER2(Tag,NfcMobile,Kab,PrxtokTag)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = I
IntruderKnowledge = {Tag, User,NfcMobile,I,PrxtokI,RPeI}
Figure 9.6: CasperFDR modelling of NFC UKC reader/writer protocol
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
10.1 Contributions
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a technology that enables mobile phones to communicate with the
outside world by touching other objects. A number of interesting contactless applications are now available
for mobile payment, ticketing, coupons and access control.
The security of these applications is undoubtedly critical before proliferation and mainstream adoption.
There are a number of applications and security aspects that require considerations. In this thesis we select
one of the most popular NFC applications, the NFC Mobile Coupons (M-coupon) to enhance its security.
The journey of securing the NFC M-coupon has already started since 2007. Three NFC M-coupon
protocols have been proposed in the literature, and all of which tried to meet some NFC M-coupon security
requirements by designing secure cryptographic protocols. Likewise, all of them have “informally” analysed
the security of their protocols and how their protocols meet the claimed security requirements.
This thesis began where the above finished. We asserted that there are two main aspects that can
enhance the security of the NFC M-coupon: (1) enhancement related to the NFC security protocols and (2)
enhancement related to the security requirements.
The first contributions are related to the enhancement of NFC security protocols. We performed a
formal security analysis of NFC M-coupon protocols by CasperFDR. Four existing protocols in the literature
were formally analysed, and solutions were suggested when attacks are found in these protocols. We noticed
there is a need for new protocols that gather all advantages that were partly stated in the previous protocols.
Therefore, we propose new protocols, the Marketing-oriented NFC M-coupon protocols. The main features of
the protocols is that they uses lightweight cryptography (hash functions) and are divided into two protocols
depending on the marketing business models required by a company. We have formally analysed the protocols
and found no attack.
Moreover, we practically demonstrate, and explain, an advanced use of CasperFDR. There is a limit of
what one can model with CasperFDR, and we push this boundary. We also illustrate the modelling from the
underneath theory angle (CSP aspect), which is beyond the knowledge required to model using CasperFDR
tool (black-box approach). Modelling protocols in CasperFDR requires only an abstract description of
the protocol and necessary security requirements to be checked. Then, CasperFDR provides the result
detailing whether an attack has been found. This is called a black-box approach as the underlying models
are not shown to the user. This approach is important to enable a black-box user to become more powerful
in protocol analysis using CasperFDR. The results of the approach enable a user to model a protocol and
capture its requirements in a very precise way. This approach was illustrated deeply throughout the thesis by
firstly and formally defining the NFC M-coupon requirements and then testing whether the NFC M-coupon
protocols, including the protocols, satisfy these definitions.
Furthermore, we invented some new techniques for correctness in CasperFDR. We faced some challenges
in modelling one of the analysed NFC M-coupon protocol, the Hsiang et al. (QR-based) protocol. The
first challenge was modelling the quadratic residue theorem. We proposed two ways of abstracting QR in
the model with the pros and cons of both methods. The second challenge was solving a problem with
CasperFDR that one can not model complex procedures of placing some data in the issuer memory during
the manufacturing stage. We highlighted alternative, but equivalent, ways of modelling these complex
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procedures. This is another inventive way of utilising CasperFDR for advanced modelling through simple
ideas with reasonable justifications.
The second contributions are related to the security requirements of the NFC M-coupon protocols.
We divided the security requirements into two categories: (1) a number of security requirements that address
specific NFC M-coupon protocols threats and (2) a one security requirement that addresses a threat (the
relay attack) that affects all NFC protocols, and consequently affects the NFC M-coupon protocols.
Initially, we refined the specific NFC M-coupon requirements to establish eight clear, formally defined,
security requirements as follows:
• Confidentiality
• Issuer’s ID anonymity
• Forgery Protection:
– No Unauthorized Generation
– No Manipulation
• Unauthorized Copying
– Not Transferable
– User Authentication
• Data Integrity
• No Multiple Cash-in
This part of the contribution is the basis for the contribution of the first section of the thesis. We
developed a framework formally defining the NFC M-coupon requirements. The formal definitions are
applicable to any protocol trying to meet the NFC M-coupon requirement. We applied this framework to
the existing protocols and also to our protocols.
In addition, we proposed solutions to address the relay attack. The relay attack manipulates the prox-
imity factor between entities. The attacker relays the signal between two distant parties while both of them
believe they are next to each other. The main challenge in this attack is the fact that cryptographic mea-
sures are not believed to be sufficient in addressing the attack on their own. Therefore, there are a number
of non-cryptographic measures aiming to address the relay attack. We discussed these non-cryptographic
measures and showed how each one has some disadvantages. Based on this analysis, we concluded with the
following requirements which an ideal solution should feature:
1. Response time is not a critical factor due to the difficulty associated with finding a solution based on
measuring it.
2. Focusing on the main problem (proving the proximity).
3. The ability to run on top of, or within, normal cryptographic protocols.
4. Easy to apply into a system.
5. Accurate.
We introduce a novel observation about NFC; the relationship between cryptographic protocols and the
relay attack. In the NFC domain, key establishment protocols are more suitable for authenticating the user
than traditional entity authentication protocols. The main difference between the two groups of protocols is
that the key establishment protocols have a key confirmation step. The key confirmation step is when both
parties prove the possession of a key. We believe the key confirmation step can be a base to solve the relay
attack problem, and bring cryptographic protocols back to the forefront of the literature, and a possible
solution to the problem.
We developed new protocols for addressing the NFC mobile relay attack, “User Key Confirmation Pro-
tocols” (UKC). The UKC protocols meet the five requirements mentioned above and include three different
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protocols for all the NFC modes of operations (card emulation/ reader-writer/ peer-to-peer). In order to
utilise the concept of the key confirmation step in NFC mobile, we designed a sophisticated implementation
by combining three main players: NFC mobile, Cryptography and the user. The one who confirms the
possession of the key is the user themselves, especially thanks to the technologically advanced smart phones
of today. There are two main methods by which a device can prove its proximity in the UKC protocols,
Proximity Token and Proximity Challenge/Response. The user can prove to other NFC devices that their
NFC mobile is in a close distance by performing Proximity Challenge/Response with another NFC devices.
On the other hand, the user can verify the proximity of other NFC devices by making an informed decision
on whether the other NFC device is in close distance by an entity’s Proximity Token.
Finally, we formally analysed the security of the UKC protocols by CasperFDR. We highlighted an
interesting part of the modelling: (1) modelling the user and their mobile, and (2) modelling the reader’s
touch screen.
10.2 Insights and future work
The focus of secure sensitive applications of NFC has begun ever since the technology was invented. However,
not all NFC applications have been subjected to reasonable security research. Even with the M-coupon
applications, which have been fairly developed, we find a couple of vulnerabilities that break the security
promises.
This research builds on a fundamental security need for the NFC community. There are a variety of
aspects that researchers can contribute toward making NFC a more robust secure technology. We sought
to address a fundamental security need in NFC technology by establishing a strong road map for designing
the underlying cryptographic architectures for NFC applications. This road map is illustrated deeply with
the NFC M-coupon protocols. Moreover, all NFC applications can now utilise the UKC mobile protocols
to addressing the relay attack. The NFC M-coupon community can utilise this research to make secure
business models that save their money and reputation. This is also a step forward for the NFC community
in general as this enhances the trust of this technology by people.
There are a number of lessons that we have learned from this research. NFC security is a goal not easily
achieved. NFC security, like other technologies, is a continuing process which, if not established correctly,
leads to undesirable consequences such as the loss of trust in NFC. NFC has been occasionally introduced
as a ground-breaking technology that has the potential to solve all our problems. This may be true, but
dreams may become nightmares with poor security.
Yet another aspect is lessons learned from the modelling process. When modelling a protocol with
some requirements, one should be flexible with these requirements. Security requirements normally seem
reasonable when they are initially written, but through the formal definition and analysis some of them either
make no sense or they contain more than one requirement. Moreover, one should explore the potential of
current analysing tools. Obviously, we can not demand from a tool more that what it was designed for, but
understanding the theory that a tool was built upon with a good understanding of the tool’s function can
push the boundaries to some extent. The work that we did with CasperFDR is typically done through the
original CSP language. We find that CasperFDR as a tool is not only able to do typical protocol modelling
but also captures advanced requirements and adjusts the threat model. Nevertheless, CasperFDR can be
improved in many ways, such as improving the attack trace to become more illustrative with some automated
graphical interface. Even though a graphical interface may seem trivial, it will help with illustrating the
concept. In addition, an insight for developing NFC protocols is that they are likely to run over devices that
have a limited computing ability such as mobiles and tags. If it uses a simple and lightweight cryptography
to meet security requirements, the NFC protocol is likelier to be implemented in reality. However, these
kinds of encryptions are not that easy to design. We advice to follow a formal approach, as demonstrated
in this thesis, to make sure a lightweight protocol is secure.
There are a number of possible future work directions.
• The formal security approach provided in this thesis can be used to create new NFC protocols for
different applications. The requirements of other applications might overlap with the NFC M-coupon,
which will make the modelling process much easier. In fact, the approach can be implemented for any
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other existing technologies, such as the Internet and wireless, or new similar emerging technologies
such as iBeacon which was introduced by Apple1.
• Designing a formal general architecture for NFC protocols that normally include three parties: a user,
initiator and receiver. For example, in M-coupon: a user, an issuer and a cashier, in M-payment: a
user, a bank and a merchant and in M-ticketing: a user, an issuer and the gate. It would be very useful
for NFC community to have a general secure architecture that deals with such protocols. Required
modification for each application should be allowed within the main architecture itself.
• Apply the NFC User Key Confirmation protocols (NFC UKC) with public keys. Currently, they are
provided with shared keys.
• The usability aspect of the NFC UKC protocols needs to be consider as well. In a real world application,
information included inside a PrxTok should consider the usability factor by selecting some information
rather than showing all the information.
• Investigating the applicability of the concept of using the key confirmation step to address the relay
attack in RFID protocols. RFID protocols still suffer from the relay attack. We manage, in NFC, to
prove the applicability of the concept with mobile phones and users. There might be a way in the
RFID domain to do so, maybe through new ideas and devices such as sensors.
1https://developer.apple.com/ibeacon/
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